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I. INTRODUCTION
A law exists that allows the government to strip a person of a
specific sort of property if the person merely thinks about selling it for
a profit, or about precluding another person from using it.1 That law
is the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).2 Courts
and legal commentators have recognized that a person can hold valid
property rights in a data arrangement that represents an Internet web-
site address, otherwise known as a domain name; e.g., "business.com"
is property. 3 Furthermore, a person can lawfully register a domain
name containing a trademark even if that person is not the mark
holder: registering "nike.com" is not unlawful, even if the domain-
1. See discussion infra Part IV.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
3. See discussion infra Part V.A. 1 .b.
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name registrant4 is not Nike, Inc.5 Under the ACPA, a court may strip
a registrant of property rights to a domain name containing a trade-
mark if the registrant possesses the domain name with a bad-faith in-
tent to profit from the trademark.6  The presence of a bad-faith in-
tent-or in other words, the presence of a registrant thinking
impermissible thoughts 7 -is the only condition necessary for a court
to appropriate the registrant's domain name. 8 Impermissible thoughts
include thoughts about selling the domain name to a mark holder, and
thoughts about precluding a mark holder from using the domain
name. 9 Possessing "nike.com" while intending to sell it for a profit to
Nike, Inc., or alternatively, while intending to preclude Nike, Inc.
from procuring it, is actionable under the ACPA.
The reason that the ACPA is based purely on a registrant's in-
tent, rather than the actual use of the domain name, is that its purpose
is to thwart the practice of cybersquatting.1 ° Cybersquatting occurs
when a domain-name registrant intends to profit from a trademark
contained within the domain name. 1 Cybersquatters lawfully own
4. Throughout this Article, the term "registrant" refers to a person who reserves the
right to use an Internet domain name. It never refers to a person who reserves the right to use
a trademark with the Patent and Trademark Office.
5. Panavision Int'l, L.P., v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Registra-
tion of a trademark as a domain name, without more, is not a commercial use of the trademark
and therefore is not within the prohibition of the [Lanham] Act.") (emphasis added) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal.
1996)); accord Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 496, 498
(E.D. Va. 1999) ("Nothing in trademark law requires that title to domain names that incorpo-
rate trademarks or portions of trademarks be provided to trademark holders."); HQM, Ltd. v.
Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500 (D. Md. 1999); see also discussion infra Part III.
6. The ACPA imposes liability for merely having a bad-faith intent while possessing a
domain name. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1. As discussed in Part IV, this conclusion fol-
lows from the fact that the ACPA states only two conditions for liability-(1) bad-faith intent
and (2) registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name-which conditions need not occur at
the same time. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1. Because they need not occur at the same
time, possession of a domain name always satisfied the second condition of liability, so that
the statute imposes liability for possession of a domain name with a bad-faith intent. See dis-
cussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
7. A person's intent under the ACPA represents his or her state of mind, completely
dependent on the person's thoughts. See People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Dough-
ney, 263 F.3d 359, 369 (4th Cir. 2001); see also THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1078 (2d
ed. 1989) (defining intent to mean "that which is willed, pleasure, desire .... Mind, or an act
of the mind; understanding; the mental faculties generally; frame of mind, will spirit; percep-
tion, judgement; what is in the mind, notion, opinion, or thought of any kind").
8. See discussion supra note 6 and infra Part IV.A. 1.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
10. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
11. Id; 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE-
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domain names that contain trademarks, and in most instances, do ab-
solutely nothing with them. 12 They merely intend to sell the domain
names to the corresponding trademark holders. Because cybersquat-
ting does not involve any use of a domain name, a law prohibiting cy-
bersquatting cannot be based on a specific use. The law, the ACPA,
must be based on intent.'
3
The following narrative depicts a situation analogous to cyber-
squatting that illustrates how and why the ACPA is based on a regis-
trant's intent. A certain man, Mark, owned an apple orchard on an is-
land that at one spot was within 50 yards of a nearby mainland. Mark
sold his apples to a community on the mainland, each day filling a
boat with apples, and then delivering them to the community where
people paid a handsome price for the delicious commodity. Mark did
well for many years, his apple business gaining notoriety throughout
the community. Curiously, however, Mark never considered building
a footbridge between the island and the mainland so that consumers
could purchase his apples more easily.
One day a certain entrepreneur, Cy, visited the community, and
observed the success of Mark's apple business. Always trying to
make a quick buck, Cy decided to build an inexpensive footbridge be-
tween the island and the mainland. He built it in less than an hour,
and in doing so, secured the single spot on the island that was within
50 yards of the mainland. Cy then attempted to sell the bridge to
Mark for an amount equal to Mark's apple profits over the last two
years. Mark laughed at the offer, so Cy just sat on his bridge and
waited. Before long, people noticed the bridge and gathered around
in hopes of crossing it to buy apples from Mark without having to
wait for Mark to come deliver them. Cy let no one cross his bridge.
This continued for a month, every day more people gathering at the
bridge with the hope and expectation of crossing it to buy island ap-
TITION § 25:77 (4th ed. 2004); ROBERTA. BADGLEY, DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES § 1.01 (2003)
(defining cybersquatting as occurring "when someone registers a domain name identical or
confusingly similar to a well-known trademark with the hope of selling it to the trademark
owner at a hefty profit").
12. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 5-6 (defining cybersquatters as persons who "register
well-known brand names as Internet domain names in order to extract payment from the right-
ful owners of the marks" and who "register well-known marks as domain names and ware-
house those marks with the hope of selling them to the highest bidder"); 2 MATTHEW BENDER
Co., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 7A.06 (Jerome Gilson ed., 2003) ("Cyber-
squatters register trademarks in Internet domain names with no intention of developing a vi-
able web site but instead to hold the name for resale to either the trademark owner or a third
party.").
13. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4.
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pies. Mark soon realized that if the bridge were open, he would likely
reap twice his current profits. Although Cy's price was ridiculously
high for the minimal labor that Cy had expended in building the
bridge, the economics of the situation made sense for Mark to pay Cy
the outrageous amount.
Mark was just about to pay Cy his asking price when the gov-
ernment unexpectedly intervened. Seeing the community's desire to
cross the bridge, noting Mark's earnest efforts at producing a valuable
product, and observing the ridiculously high price that Cy sought for
his bridge, the government passed a statute to remedy the inequitable
situation. The new law stated that any person who (1) acquires a
bridge (by either building or purchasing one), and (2) intends to sell
his or her bridge to an island business at a profit is obligated to imme-
diately transfer ownership of the bridge to the island business. The
statute did not require that the two conditions occur at the same time:
a person would be liable for developing the prohibited intent even if
that intent occurred well after the person had acquired a bridge. The
statute also applied retroactively, such that any person in possession
of a bridge at the time of its enactment, thereby having acquired it
through some means, satisfied the first condition of liability. Thus,
the statute attached liability for possessing a bridge with a specific in-
tent. It deprived Cy of his bridge because he engaged in impermissi-
ble thinking. By the stroke of the legislative pen, Cy lost his bridge to
Mark.
It seemed that everyone was happy with the new law: Mark
reaped great profits; the mainlanders had better access to island ap-
ples; and the government had instituted a policy that resulted in a
more productive market system. No one believed that Cy had been
wronged as he had only expended less than an hour's worth of work
in building the bridge. The people supported the market-efficient
outcome of the bridge statute.
This analogy aptly depicts the cyberquatting situation. Like the
bridge, a domain name containing a trademark could enable the pub-
lic to access a commercial business. The public reasonably expects
the domain name to belong to the mark holder, just as the public did
the bridge. That expectation begets the domain name's value, as it
did the bridge's value. That value, for both the domain name and the
bridge, is ultimately derived from a third party's efforts to produce a
quality product. Both the cybersquatter and the bridge owner seek to
profit from another business's efforts.
The analogy also captures the relevant legal history of conduct
WILLAMETTE LA WREVIEW
made actionable under the ACPA. In the bridge narrative, Cy legally
owned the bridge before the statute existed. Only after the statute did
his conduct of building a bridge and intending to sell it become ac-
tionable. Similarly, prior to the ACPA, cybersquatting was legal.
14
Although some courts tried to define cybersquatting as behavior that
trademark law could prevent, in the end, trademark law was impotent
against this Internet arbitrage. 15 Trademark law could prohibit a reg-
istrant from using the domain name only in a way that promoted the
sale of a good or service-in a way that made use of the mark in a
commercial setting. 16 Cybersquatters engage in no such commercial
use; they merely reserve a right to post a website at a particular do-
main name (which domain name happens to contain a trademark). 17
Consequently, prior to the ACPA, trademark law was paralyzed
against cybersquatting, unable to prevent cybersquatters from ransom-
ing domain names to mark holders.1
8
Finally, the bridge analogy illustrates the essential characteristics
of the ACPA's liability conditions. Like the bridge statute, the ACPA
requires that only two conditions exist for the government to strip a
person of a domain name. a9 First, the person must register, traffic, or
use a domain name containing a trademark.20  Second, the person
must have a bad-faith intent to profit from the mark within the domain
name. 2 1 Just as the two conditions in the bridge statute resulted in li-
ability for mere possession plus intent, so also do these two ACPA
conditions impose liability for mere possession of a domain name
with a specific intent.22 Like the first condition in the bridge statute,
the first condition in the ACPA is essentially a requirement that a reg-
istrant acquire a domain name: acquisition of a domain name occurs
through either registering or trafficking in domain names.23 And
similar to both conditions in the bridge statute, the two ACPA condi-
tions need not occur simultaneously.24 To be liable, a person need not
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127(2000).
17. See discussion infra Part III.A. 1.
18. See discussion infra Part I1I.B.2.
19. 15 U.S.C. § l125(d)(1)(A).
20. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
21. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
22. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
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acquire a domain name with a bad-faith intent; the person could ac-
quire the domain name, much later develop a bad-faith intent, and
then face liability. Lastly, like the bridge statute, the ACPA's first
condition of liability is retroactive such that even if a person had ac-
quired a domain name prior to the ACPA, the person fulfills the con-
dition that he or she must acquire a domain name to be liable.2 6 The
condition that a person register, traffic, or use a domain name is satis-
fied merely if a person possesses one.27  Liability exists under the
ACPA for possessing a domain name with a bad-faith intent.28
The ACPA and the hypothetical bridge statute effectively pro-
vide a legal means for resolving a most inequitable situation that is
solely a function of a property owner's intent. 29 That effectiveness,
however, exacts a high cost. Both laws violate the Takings Clause:
they allow the government to take property without providing just
compensation.30 While this conclusion may appear evident in the
bridge analogy, it is not immediately apparent in its virtual counter-
part, the ACPA. Showing that the ACPA violates the Takings Clause
requires establishing the following two premises: (1) that domain
names are property subject to the protections of the Takings Clause,
and (2) that under Supreme Court takings jurisprudence, the ACPA
results in an uncompensated governmental appropriation of the prop-
erty.31 Support for the first premise arises from legal authority recog-
nizing, implicitly and explicitly, that a registrant holds property rights
in a unique data arrangement in the Internet medium, which data ar-
rangement functions as a virtual "space." 32 Further support for this
premise arises from Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing that
property rights can exist in data arrangements.
33
25. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2000) (statutory note) ("[The ACPA] shall apply to all domain
names registered before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act .... ); see also dis-
cussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
28. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
29. BADGLEY, supra note 11, § 1.01 ("The ACPA has proven a capable tool for wrest-
ing domain names from cybersquatters ...."); see also discussion infra Part IV.
30. See discussion infra Part V; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-01 (1984) (examining
whether the plaintiff had property interests in a trade secret protected by the Takings Clause,
and whether the governmental act in question resulted in a taking under existing Supreme
Court jurisprudence).
32. E.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030-36 (9th Cir. 2003); see also discussion
infra Part V.A. .b.
33. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1002-03; see also discussion infra Part V.A.2.
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The second premise requires analyzing the ACPA under the Su-
preme Court's three-factor balancing test for determining whether a
government act constitutes a taking, as outlined in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.34 The first factor of the Penn
Central test examines the character of the governmental act: whether
it is a complete appropriation, or alternatively, a regulation.35 If the
character of the act is a complete appropriation, then the act is always
a taking, regardless of the other two Penn Central factors; conversely,
if the act is a regulation, it limits only some uses of the property, and
so it is not necessarily a taking depending on the outcome of the other
two Penn Central factors.36
At first glance, the ACPA seems to be a regulation rather than a
complete appropriation because it prohibits only a single use of a do-
main-using a domain name to cybersquat. 37 Further examination of
the purported regulation, however, reveals that the ACPA effects a
complete appropriation. 38 It is a complete appropriation for two rea-
sons. First, the single "use" of a domain name that the statute regu-
lates cannot be constitutionally regulated. 39 As mentioned above, cy-
bersquatting amounts to nothing more than possessing a domain name
with a bad-faith intent. The ACPA defines bad-faith intent based en-
tirely on the speech of a registrar.4 0 A First Amendment analysis of
the ACPA reveals that its restriction of the expressed bad-faith intent
is unconstitutional a.4  A registrant's intent is therefore not a constitu-
tional basis for transferring the domain name: the ACPA's remedy is
applied for no justifiable reason. 42 The statute effects a naked transfer
of property, or in other words, a complete appropriation.43
The second reason that the ACPA effects a complete appropria-
tion rather than a regulation is that under the ACPA, courts may strip
a registrant of property solely because the registrant exercises a right
34. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005 (applying the Penn Central balancing test to de-
termine whether the government had taken the plaintiffs property interest in an arrangement
of data); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also dis-
cussion infra Part V.B.
35. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; see also discussion infra Part V.B.1.
36. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
37. See discussion infra Part V.B. 1.
38. See discussion infra Part V.B. l.a-b.
39. See discussion infra Part V.B. 1.a.
40. See discussion infra Part V.B. L.a.
41. See discussion infra Part V.B. 1.a.
42. See discussion infra Part V.B.l.a.
43. See discussion infra Part V.B.1.a.
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essential to the meaning of property.44 The right to preclude all others
from possessing a res constitutes a fundamental property right, with-
out which a person cannot own property.45 Courts have found a bad-
faith intent based on a registrant's intent to preclude a third party-a
mark holder-from possessing the domain name.46  Courts have
therefore transferred ownership of a domain name because the regis-
trant exercises rights inherent to the meaning of property; that is, the
basis for stripping the registrant of property is the fact that the regis-
trant exercises rights of ownership in the property.47  The purported
"use" that the ACPA regulates is ownership of the property. For this
reason, the ACPA effects a complete appropriation, and accordingly
fails the first factor of the Penn Central test.
The second factor of the Penn Central balancing test does not
suggest that the ACPA results in a taking.48 But the third factor
does.49  The third factor examines whether the regulation interferes
with reasonable investment-backed expectations, 50 including whether
the regulation consists of retroactive legislation.51 The retroactivity of
the ACPA upsets a registrant's reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations. 52  As stated above, the first condition of liability under the
ACPA-acquisition of a domain name containing a trademark-
applies retroactively.53  Courts have also applied the statute retroac-
44. See discussion infra Part V.B. 1.b.
45. See discussion infra Part V.B.1.b.
46. See, e.g., Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 499 (2d Cir.
2000) (procuring a domain name to preclude a competitor from posting a website); see also
discussion infra Part V.B. .b(ii).
47. See discussion infra Part V.B. 1.b.
48. The second Penn Central factor is the economic impact of the governmental action
on the property. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. The Supreme Court has specifically held that
regulations that result in less value in personal property-as opposed to real property-are not
unconstitutional. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992). Domain
names appear to be personal property. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining personal property to be "[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject to owner-
ship and not classified as real property"); but see discussion infra note 556. The economic
impact of prohibiting a registrant from thinking about selling the domain name to profit from a
trademark is accordingly of no consequence. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28. Thus, this sec-
ond factor in the Penn Central test does not imply that prohibiting an intent to sell domain
names results in a taking.
49. See discussion infra Part V.B.3.
50. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
51. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-29, 533 (1998) (plurality); Concrete Pipe
& Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645-46
(1993); United States v. Sec. Ind. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982).
52. See discussion infra Part V.B.3.
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2000) (statutory note).
WILLAMETTE LA W REVIEW
tively to the second condition of liability-possessing a bad-faith in-
tent.54  Applied retroactively to the bad-faith intent condition, the
ACPA deprives registrants of property based on thoughts that, at the
time the registrants were thinking them, were lawful. 55 After enacting
the ACPA, the government was able to strip cybersquatters of their
property based on their thoughts that had occurred before its enact-
ment.56 Such retroactive legislation interferes with the reasonable ex-
pectations of registrants. 57 Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, then,
the ACPA effects a governmental appropriation of property.
The ensuing four parts of this Article prove the arguments briefly
discussed in this introduction. Part II of this Article discusses the
general principles of trademark law and sets forth a relevant factual
background of how the Internet operates. Part III analyzes the general
principles of trademark law as applied to the Internet domain-name
context. It concludes that a mark holder's property rights do not in-
clude the right to enjoin a registrant from cybersquatting. Part III also
examines judicial attempts to fit the practice of cybersquatting within
the purview of conduct that trademark law excludes; it concludes that
these attempts ultimately fail. Part IV recites the ACPA and provides
a statutory analysis of its conditions for liability. It opines that these
conditions are satisfied when a registrant merely possesses a domain
name while thinking certain thoughts. Part IV also provides an ac-
count of how courts have enforced the ACPA by finding liability
solely based on a registrant's intent.
Part V argues that the ACPA effects an unconstitutional taking.
In support of this argument, Part V examines: (1) whether a domain
name represents a res over which a registrant holds property rights in-
dependent of the registrant's service agreement with the registrar;58
(2) whether the Takings Clause protects the property rights a regis-
trant may hold in the domain name;59 (3) whether the character of the
governmental action under the ACPA is a complete appropriation
rather than a regulation; 60 and (4) whether the retroactive nature of the
ACPA interferes with the reasonable investment-backed expectations
54. See, e.g., Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 499 (2d Cir.
2000) (finding bad-faith intent based on thoughts occurring prior to the ACPA).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See discussion infra Part V.B.3.
58. See discussion infra Part V.A. 1.
59. See discussion infra Part V.A.2.
60. See discussion infra Part V.B. 1.
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of a registrant.61 The inquiry into the third point-the character of the
governmental action-analyzes: (i) whether the registrant's expres-
sions of a bad-faith intent merit First Amendment protection; 62 and
(ii) whether the circumstances giving rise to a bad-faith intent are also
part of a registrant's fundamental property rights.63 These analyses in
Part V all point to the conclusion that the ACPA effects a taking.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF TRADEMARK LAW AND THE INTERNET
In examining whether the ACPA violates the Takings Clause, it
is necessary to establish that a cybersquatter does not violate a mark
holder's property rights under general principles of trademark law
that existed prior to the ACPA. If this conclusion were established, it
would imply that the ACPA is not a statute that merely defines a new
remedy for infringing a person's existing property rights. Before pro-
ceeding to prove this conclusion, one must first understand the gen-
eral principles of trademark law and the factual circumstances of how
the Internet operates. Part II sets forth this background information
preparatory for the argument in Part III that a cybersquatter does not
violate trademark law as it existed prior to the ACPA. Section A dis-
cusses the trademark doctrines of consumer confusion and dilution.
Section B describes how a domain name functions on the Internet and
the process of registering a domain name.
A. Trademark Law
A person who holds a trademark has a property interest in the
mark.64 That property interest comprises two basic rights: (1) the
right to exclude another from creating consumer confusion over the
mark;65 and (2) the right to exclude another from decreasing the
goodwill that the public associates with the mark, or in other words,
the right to protect against dilution.66 Each right is discussed below.
The primary property right of a mark holder is the right to pro-
tect the mark from consumer confusion.67 This right of protection
61. See discussion infra Part V.B.3.
62. See discussion infra Part V.B.I.a.
63. See discussion infra Part V.B. 1 .b.
64. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 2:14 ("In the sense of an 'exclusive right' trade-
marks can be categorized as a form of 'property."').
65. Id.
66. Id. § 2:20.
67. Id. § 2:14.
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against consumer confusion consists of the right to exclude others
from commercially using the mark in a way that would lead consum-
ers to be confused as to the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the
mark holder's good or service.68 This right prevents the Chrysler
automobile company from attaching a BMW symbol to the automo-
biles that Chrysler sells to consumers. If Chrysler were to do so, con-
sumers would be mistaken or confused as to whether the automobiles
that Chrysler manufactures are actually associated with the BMW car
company. Chrysler would then face liability under the consumer-
confusion doctrine of trademark law. This right to prevent consumer
confusion is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), which attaches liability
for any "uses [of a mark] in commerce" that would cause consumers
to become confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the origin or spon-
sorship of the mark.69 Violation of this right, as stated in § 1125(a), is
referred to as trademark "infringement. 70
A second property right of a mark holder is the right to exclude
others from using the mark in a way that would damage the mark
holder's goodwill that consumers associate with the goods or services
that a mark symbolizes. 71 It is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
72
This right protects against a third party's "use in commerce" of a
mark that results in "dilution,, 73 which is "the lessening of the capac-
ity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or serv-
ices ... Dilution can be manifested in two ways: blurring or tar-
nishment.75 Blurring occurs when a person who is not authorized to
use a mark uses it in a commercial manner that causes the public to
form a mental connection between the mark and the good or service
68. Id. §§ 2:14, 24:6.
69. In addition to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) also protects against con-
sumer confusion. Together, these two sections constitute federal trademark protection against
a likelihood of consumer confusion. They impose liability on any person who "uses in com-
merce" a trademark in a way that: (1) is likely to cause consumers to become confused, mis-
taken, or deceived as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the mark holder's goods, serv-
ices, or commercial activities; or (2) constitutes commercial advertising or promotion and
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of the mark holder's
goods, services, or commercial activities. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (1), 1125(a) (2000).
70. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 23:2.
71. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, §§ 2:15, 2:20, 2:30.
72. Section 1125(c) attaches liability to any person who makes a "commercial use" of a
famous trademark in a way that "causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark." 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c).
73. Id.; 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24:70.
74. 15U.S.C.§ 1127.
75. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24.67.
[41:1
2005] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING ACT 13
of an unauthorized user.76 The unique identifying capacity of a mark
is lessened.77 For example, a wristwatch company that manufactures
cheap watches could attach the BMW trademark to its watches in an
attempt to convince consumers that they are of the same quality as
BMW automobiles. Simply by seeing the BMW mark on the wrist-
watches, consumers would believe that the products are of the same
quality as BMW automobiles, but consumers would not likely believe
that the German car manufacturer is the sponsor of the watch. The
BMW mark would then be diluted to a certain extent; the wristwatch
purchasers would associate BMW with both the German car manufac-
turer and the cheap wristwatches. The ability for the actual sponsor
of the mark, the German car manufacturer, to make the BMW mark
retain its unique identifying capacity is lessened. Dilution through
blurring thus occurs when consumers form a mental connection be-
tween the mark and the unauthorized user's good or service. 78 Al-
though consumers may not be confused as to the fact that the mark
holder does not sponsor the good or service, the consumer forms a
mental connection with the unauthorized user's good or service when
observing the mark.79 That mental connection weakens the unique
identifying capacity of the mark.80 Dilution "blurs" the image of the
mark.81
Dilution through tarnishment is similar to dilution through blur-
ring.82 Tarnishment occurs when an unauthorized user of a trademark
tarnishes or degrades the distinctive quality of a mark.83 Consumers
associate the mark with both the sponsoring mark holder and the tar-
nishing good or image. Pornographic pictures bearing the BMW
mark would be an example of tarnishment. Through either blurring or
tarnishment, a person can commit trademark dilution.
84
These two rights, the right to exclude commercial uses that cre-
76. Id. §§ 24:68, 24:70.




81. Id. § 24:68; Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 1963).
82. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, §§ 24:68, 24:69 (defining dilution through blur-
ring and dilution through tarnishment, respectively).
83. Id.; L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The
threat of tarnishment arises when the goodwill and reputation of a plaintiffs trademark is
linked to products which are of shoddy quality or which conjure associations that clash with
the associations generated by the owner's lawful use of the mark[.]").
84. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24:67.
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ate consumer confusion and the right to exclude commercial uses that
create dilution, comprise a mark holder's property rights.85 Trade-
mark law does not confer a "right in gross" upon the mark holder; it
does not prohibit any and all reproduction of the mark.86 In the words
of a leading trademark scholar, Professor J. Thomas McCarthy: "[A]
trademark is not a 'taboo' word that shall not be reproduced anywhere
without permission." 87 As the Ninth Circuit stated, "[a] trademark
owner has a property right only insofar as is necessary to prevent cus-
tomer confusion as to who produced the goods and to facilitate differ-
entiation of the trademark owner's goods.,
88
Federal trademark law codifies this restriction on a mark
holder's rights in 15 U.S.C. § 1127. It provides that "use in com-
merce" as referred to in the dilution and consumer-confusion statutes
means "the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade,
and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark." 89 Trademark in-
fringement or dilution only occurs if the person has used the mark in
the ordinary course of trade.90 For instance, a consumer who pur-
chases both a Chrysler automobile and a cheap wristwatch, then af-
fixes the BMW mark on both products, but never offers to sell either
product, would not be liable for trademark violation under either the
doctrine of consumer confusion or the doctrine of dilution.
Section 1127 also provides that "use in commerce" denotes us-
ing the mark on goods or services.91 To use a mark on goods, a per-
son must place the mark "on the goods or their containers or the dis-
plays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto,
or... on documents associated with the goods .... , 92 To use a mark
on services, a person must use or display it in the "sale or advertising
of services ... rendered in commerce." 93 Accordingly, if a person
were to detach a BMW emblem from a BMW automobile and then
85. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 2 (discussing the fundamental princi-
ples of trademark protection).
86. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24:11.
87. Id. (interpreting Justice Holmes's statement: "When the mark is used in such a way
that does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being
used to tell the truth. It is not taboo." Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)).
88. Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir.
1980).
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sell that emblem without affixing it to any good, the person would not
commit any use in commerce under § 1127. The emblem represents
the mark itself, rather than a good that is distinct from the mark. The
German car manufacturer's property rights in the mark would not be
violated because in selling the emblem, a person does not place the
mark on a good or service. Thus, trademark law confines a mark
holder's rights to those that exclude another person from using the
mark to promote or sell something.94
B. The Internet
To apply the above principles of trademark law to the Internet
medium, one must possess a general understanding of how the Inter-
net functions. At its most fundamental level, the Internet comprises
electronic pulses that computers send to each other through a global
network of interconnected computer networks. 95  The computers
translate the pulses into data, which both identifies the computer
sending the pulses, and displays information on the Internet user's
screen.96 The information regarding the identification of the com-
puter is in the form of a numerical code called the Internetworking
Protocol Address (IP address). 97 The IP address specifies the exact
computer, and the file on the computer, where information sought is
stored.98 A computer can thereby request stored information from an-
other computer by specifying the IP address designating the computer
that stores the information.99 That stored information is displayed on
the screen of the requesting computer in the form of a "webpage."' 100
Because the numeric IP addresses are cumbersome for Internet
users to remember, Internet users instead employ an alphanumeric de-
scriptive tag called a domain name to refer to an IP address. 0 1 An
Internet user requests to view a webpage by typing a domain name in
94. See id.
95. DAVID WEINBERGER, SMALL PIECES LOOSELY JOINED 159-60 (2002); Lawrence B.
Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 815, 821 (2004).
96. WEINBERGER, supra note 95, at 158-59; Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Info-
bahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law of Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (1995),
at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vli1/burk.html.
97. Burk, supra note 96, at 10.
98. WEINBERGER, supra note 95, at 158.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Burk, supra note 96, at 12.
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the line designated for website addresses.'0 2  The Internet browser
then sends a request to one of more than 500,000 "domain-name serv-
ers" in the world, which are computers that translate any domain
name into the IP address that corresponds to the desired webpage on
its specific computer. 10 3 Every domain-name server lists the IP ad-
dress of each domain name. 10 4 The request for the particular webpage
makes its way to the computer where the data composing the web-
page is stored. 10 5 The computer then sends that information through
the electronic-pulse medium to the requesting computer.
10 6
Thus, a domain name consists of a specific arrangement of data,
in the electronic-impulse medium of the Internet that functions to
provide the location where information is stored. A webpage consists
of the data retrieved from another computer and displayed on the re-
quested computer's screen. Designating that a domain name corre-
spond to a specific webpage is referred to as creating, or posting, a
website.
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) has authority to assign IP addresses to computers and do-
main names to IP addresses. 0 7 ICANN is a private non-profit corpo-
ration whose sole purpose is to manage the Internet domain-name sys-
tem.10 8  A person can reserve the right to use a particular domain
name by requesting the domain name from a network information
center, otherwise known as a registrar. 10 9 The registrar reserves the
desired domain name through ICANN, such that only one person may
102. Id. at 12-13. The text string that makes up that line is known as a Uniform Re-
source Locator, or commonly referred to as a URL. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:72.
103. WEINBERGER, supra note 95, at 158.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 158-59.
107. Gale R. Peterson, Overview of Intellectual Property, in UNDERSTANDING THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 2003, at 11, 187-88 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Property Course, Handbook Series No. GO-01BF, 2004).
108. Id. ICANN became effective in June 1998 when the federal government an-
nounced that the private corporation would oversee all major decisions of the domain-name
system. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Department of Com-
merce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned of Names and Numbers (Nov. 25, 1998), at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htm (last visited Sept. 18,
2004). More information on ICANN is available at http://www.icann.org (last visited Sept. 18,
2004).
109. See Jane K. Winn, Crafting a License to Know from a Privilege to Access, 79
WASH. L. REv. 285, 302 (2004).
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reserve the right to use a domain name at any one time.'
10
Registrars issue domain names to registrants through contract.1 '
A person who reserves the right to use a domain name, a registrant,
does so by paying a nominal fee to the registrar." 2 The registration
contract allows registrants to post a website at the domain name and
reassign the right to use that domain name, but the contract does not
obligate the registrant to make any specific use of the domain
name. 113 The registrant may simply "hold" a domain name without
using it.114 Finally, most registration contracts permit a registrant to
renew the right to use the domain name at regular intervals." 15
III. THE LEGALITY OF CYBERSQUATTING PRIOR TO THE ACPA
Part III argues that a cybersquatter does not violate a mark
holder's property rights under the doctrines of consumer confusion
and dilution. Proving this argument would establish that the ACPA
does not merely assign a new remedy for violations of pre-existing
property rights under trademark law. It would establish that the
ACPA actually adds a new stick to the mark holder's bundle of prop-
erty rights. That is, the validity of this argument would imply that the
ACPA, not pre-existing trademark law, endows mark holders with a
new property right-the right to prohibit the practice of cybersquat-
ting. This new property right, as will be shown in Part IV, violates
existing property rights of a domain-name registrant. That trademark
law prior to the ACPA did not prohibit a registrant from engaging in
cybersquatting is therefore a necessary element in the argument that
the ACPA violates the Takings Clause.
The ensuing Part A analyzes the judicial attempts to fit cyber-
squatting within the scope of protected trademark property rights.
Part A concludes that these attempts fail in accordance with the statu-
tory provisions outlining the restrictions of trademark law under the
consumer-confusion and dilution doctrines. Part B provides various
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., Registration Agreement of Network Solutions, at http://www
.networksolutions.com/enUS/iegal/static-service-agreement.jhtml (last visited Sept. 18,
2004).
112. InterNIC website at http://www.internic.net/faqs/domain-names.html (last visited
Sept. 18, 2004).
113. Burk, supra note 96, at 14.
114. Id.
115. InterNIC website at http://www.internic.net/faqs/domain-names.html (last visited
Sept. 18, 2004).
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legal authority recognizing this conclusion-that cybersquatting is
outside the scope of the conduct that the doctrines of consumer confu-
sion and dilution prohibit.
A. Courts Holding That Cybersquatting Violates Trademark Law
Courts have universally recognized that "[r]egistration of a
trademark as a domain name, without more, is not a commercial use
of the trademark and therefore is not within the prohibition of the
[Lanham] Act." ' 16  Indeed, courts have readily declared that
"[n]othing in trademark law requires that title to domain names that
incorporate trademarks or portions of trademarks be provided to
trademark holders."' 1 7  Without doing "more" than registering the
domain name, the registrant has not made a commercial use of the
domain name." 18  Tension has arisen, however, as courts have at-
tempted to define the minimum level of what "more" a registrant
must do.
1. The Toeppen Cases
The inequity of cybersquatting has caused some courts to define
cybersquatting as conduct that is dilutive of a mark. Beginning with
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen and Intermatic, Inc. v. To-
eppen (collectively, "the Toeppen cases"), courts have found that cy-
bersquatting violates § 1125(c). 119 Both cases involved a factual
situation where the same defendant, Dennis Toeppen, registered do-
116. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis
added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp.
1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996); accord Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 307 (D.N.J.
1998) ('The non-commercial use of a domain name that impedes a trademark owner's use of
that domain name does not constitute dilution'....") (quoting Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Net-
work Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 960 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir.
1999)), aff'd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Net-
work Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276, 1279 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("The mere registration of a
domain name does not constitute a commercial use."); see also Brookfield Communs., Inc. v.
W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Registration... does not in
itself constitute 'use' for purposes of acquiring trademark priority.").
117. Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 496, 498
(E.D. Va. 1999), cited with approval in HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500, 508 (D.
Md. 1999); accord Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 133 (D. Mass.
1999) ("Holders of a famous mark are not automatically entitled to use that mark as their do-
main name; trademark law does not support such a monopoly."), aff'd, 232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2000).
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
119. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. 1296; Intennatic, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. 111. 1996).
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main names containing trademarks, and then posted a website that did
not advertise, promote, sell, or offer to sell any goods or services.1
2 0
In both cases, Toeppen posted a picture of a map on the website, and
then offered to sell the domain names to the mark holders for a ridicu-
lously high profit.12' Because Toeppen's website was not commercial
in nature, Toeppen did not appear to have made any "commercial
use" of the domain name as outlined in § 1127.122 The two courts,
however, held otherwise.123 The courts proclaimed that Toeppen had
committed a commercial use by attempting to sell the domain name
itself.'24 The courts further held that Toeppen had diluted the mark
because, by holding the domain name, Toeppen had lessened the
mark holder's capacity to identify and distinguish its goods and serv-
ices through the Internet. 25  Toeppen had impeded the mark holder
from selling goods and services.' 26 On appeal of the Panavision deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit adopted this reasoning. 27 Notably, the appel-
late court recognized that this form of dilution did not fit within the
traditional dilution categories of blurring and tarnishment. 1
28
At first glance, the Toeppen cases appear to rectify a most ineq-
120. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1300; Internatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1232-33.
121. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1300; Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1230, 1233.
122. See Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1300 ("After registering the 'panavision.com'
domain name, Toeppen established a website displaying aerial views of Pana, Illinois. At no
time did Toeppen use the 'panavision.com' name in connection with the sale of any goods or
services."); Intennatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1233 ("At no time did Toeppen use intermatic.com in
connection with the sale of any available goods or services. At no time has Toeppen adver-
tised the intermatic.com domain name in association with any goods or services.").
123. See Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303; Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239-40.
124. See Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303 ("Toeppen has made a commercial use of the
Panavision marks. Toeppen's 'business' is to register trademarks as domain names and then to
sell the domain names to the trademarks' owners."); Intennatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239 ("Toep-
pen's intention to arbitrage the 'intermatic.com' domain name constitutes a commercial use.").
125. See Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1304; Intennatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1240.
126. See Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1304 ("[Toeppen] eliminate[d] the capacity of the
Panavision marks to identify and distinguish Panavision's goods and services on the Inter-
net."); Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1240 ("Intermatic is not currently free to use its mark as its
domain name.").
127. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325-27 (9th Cir. 1998).
128. Id. at 1326. See also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326, and Intennatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1238-39, as examples of cases
that suggest blurring and tarnishment do not exhaust the concepts of dilution).
It is rather telling that in Panavision, the Ninth Circuit found authority to create the new
form of dilution-not from the explicit terms of § 1125(c), but rather from a senator's com-
ment about what he "hoped" the statute could do. 141 F.3d at 1326. See also Teletech Cus-
tomer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (relying
on the same senator's comment as authority to apply a new form of dilution).
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uitable situation that harms both the public at large and mark holders.
Cybersquatting prevents Internet consumers from efficiently access-
ing a mark holder's website. 129 It also prevents the mark holder from
realizing the profits associated with the mark holder's costly efforts of
promoting the mark's goodwill. 30  By registering a domain name
containing a trademark, and then selling that domain name for a great
profit, a cybersquatter is ostensibly trading on the goodwill of the
mark holder. The high profit that a cybersquatter reaps is a direct re-
flection of the value attached to a mark's goodwill; the reason that
"nike.com" is so valuable is because of the goodwill associated with
the mark even prior to the existence of the domain name. For this
reason, the prohibition on cybersquatting seems consistent with the
policy that underlies trademark law-protecting a mark holder's in-
vestment in a mark. 131 Prohibiting cybersquatting effectively prohib-
its a registrant from attaching another person's trademark to a good,
the domain name, in order to reap a large profit that would otherwise
not be available to the registrant.
But as inequitable an outcome that cybersquatting might pro-
duce, and as much as it seems to violate the policy underlying trade-
mark law, the holdings of the Toeppen cases reach outside the bounds
of a mark holder's bundle of rights.' 32 In neither case did Toeppen
commit an act that was a commercially dilutive use of the mark.
133
An act of dilution must be a "commercial use.' 3 4 The reasoning of
the Toeppen decisions is faulty because those opinions identify char-
acteristics of dilution based on the "act" of impeding the mark holder
from using the mark,135 yet that act does not constitute a commercial
use. The opinions do identify a different act-attempting to sell a
domain name-as a commercial use, 136 but that act does not result in
dilution. The cases conflate the two acts. They purport that attempt-
ing to sell a domain name is a commercial use, but then derive dilu-
tion based on the different act of impeding the mark holder from us-
129. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 2 (1999).
130. Id.
131. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 2:2.
132. For authority supporting this conclusion, see discussion infra Part III.B.
133. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
135. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1304; Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1240.
136. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303 (finding commercial use because "Toeppen
traded on the value of the marks as marks by attempting to sell the domain names to Panavi-
sion"); Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239 ("Toeppen's intention to arbitrage the 'inter-
matic.com' domain name constitutes a commercial use.").
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ing the mark. Impeding a mark holder from using the domain name is
a different act than selling a domain name. The analysis is therefore
flawed because it equivocates the two acts. A correct analysis of
these acts should examine whether each act by itself (1) is a commer-
cial use, and (2) dilutes the mark.137 As discussed below, neither the
act of impeding a mark holder from using the mark nor the act of sell-
ing a domain name violates a mark holder's rights.
a. Impeding a Mark Holder's Use of a Domain Name
"Using" a trademark to impede the mark holder from owning a
domain name is not a commercial use under § 1127. "Commercial
use" refers to the registrant's use of the mark to promote a good or
service that is not the mark holder's. 138 A registrant promotes neither
a good nor a service merely by preventing someone from registering
the domain name. Further, to commercially use a mark, a person
must either (1) place the mark on a good, and that good must actually
be "sold or transported in commerce," or (2) use it to sell or advertise
a service that is "rendered" in commerce. 139 Registering a trademark
as a domain name without posting a website does not "place" the
mark on any good or service. Possessing a domain name containing a
trademark without posting a website is analogous to writing the mark
on a tag without attaching the tag to any good or even showing the tag
to anyone. Absent a website, a domain name alone does not appear to
satisfy the conditions for "commercial use" under § 1127.140 Thus,
although "impeding" a mark holder from registering a domain name
may affect the mark holder's goods or services, "impeding" fails to be
a commercial use because it is not associated with any good or service
that is even remotely connected with the cybersquatter.
Support for this conclusion arises in the analogous context of
vanity telephone numbers. 141 Judicial decisions dealing with vanity
telephone numbers have set forth the problems with finding a com-
mercial use under § 1127 when a person has impeded a mark holder's
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
138. Id. § 1127.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 878 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[A] useful analogy exists be-
tween domain names and vanity telephone numbers."); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957-58 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (drawing a legal analogy between
domain names and vanity telephone numbers), af'd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
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access to a specific channel of communication.142 Vanity telephone
numbers and domain names both serve to provide consumers a means
of obtaining more information about goods or services. 14' Both can
incorporate a trademark into their alphanumeric code. 144 By choosing
a telephone number for their place of business that corresponds to let-
ters spelling a trademark, mark holders can exploit their marks
through the telephone medium. 145 Likewise, mark holders can exploit
the goodwill of their marks through the Internet medium by selecting
those domain names containing their respective marks. 146
Contrary to the Toeppen cases, however, vanity-number defen-
dants are not liable under trademark law unless they actively promote
a vanity number that is identical or confusingly similar to the trade-
mark. 147 In Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., the Sixth Cir-
cuit refused to find trademark infringement where the defendants had
merely secured a telephone number that was nearly identical to the
plaintiff's number, which number was itself entitled to trademark pro-
tection. 148  The defendants were competitors with the plaintiff, and
secured the number solely to profit from consumers who misdialed a
zero instead of an "0" in the number 1-800-HOLIDAY. 149 The num-
ber was sufficiently similar to the trademark so that the situation was
142. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 938 (8th Cir. 2003); Holi-
day Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 625-26 (6th Cir. 1996).
143. Compare Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 620 (explaining the function of a vanity tele-
phone number), with 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, §§ 25:71, 25:72 (explaining the function of
a domain name).
144. See Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 958 ("Domain names, like telephone num-
bers, are also valuable to trademark holders when they make it easier for customers to find the
trademark holder.").
145. Id. For example, the Verizon Company could secure the phone number 1-800-
837-4966, which corresponds to 1-800-VERIZON.
Courts have recognized that vanity telephone numbers can incorporate trademarks, and
that by so incorporating them, the vanity numbers themselves can qualify for trademark pro-
tection. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 624 ("[T]elephone numbers may be protected as trade-
marks and.., a competitor's use of a confusingly similar telephone number may be enjoined
as both trademark infringement and unfair competition."); Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar,
967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that telephone numbers are protectable if the mark has
acquired secondary meaning); Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 678 (2d
Cir. 1989) (holding that telephone numbers that correspond with a trademark may be entitled
to protection).
146. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:73.3.
147. DaimlerChrysler, 315 F.3d at 938; Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 625-26; Lockheed
Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 958 ("Where the holder of a vanity telephone number promotes it in a
way that causes a likelihood of confusion, the holder has engaged in an infringing use.").
148. 86 F.3d at 624-25.
149. Id. at 621.
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as if the defendants had secured a number containing the legally pro-
tected trademark itself. 50  Yet the defendants did not promote the
number in any way.15 1 If a consumer misdialed the number, the de-
fendants disclaimed their association with the plaintiff, and then of-
fered their own services over the phone. 52 Acknowledging that the
defendants intended to intercept calls meant for the plaintiff, and fur-
ther acknowledging that the intent of a defendant in adopting a mark
may alone be sufficient to justify the inference of consumer confu-
sion, the court held that even before looking to intent, the court must
determine whether a defendant has used a trademark in commerce.
1 53
Merely securing the number did not constitute use in commerce.
154
The court explained that "the active promotion of a deceptively simi-
lar vanity number is necessary" to find commercial use; securing the
number alone was not a commercial use because "the defendants did
not create any confusion.
'155
150. See id. at 624.
151. Id. at 624-25.
152. Id. at 621. This fact is not present in the cybersquatting context. But it does not
detract from the cybersquatter's noncommercial use argument. The truly analogous situation
would occur if the vanity-number defendants had secured the wrong number but then did not
answer the misdialed number, or alternatively, if a domain-name registrant were to post a web-
site that disclaimed affiliation with the mark holder but still competed with the mark holder
through that website. Because a cybersquatter does not usually even post a website, this fac-
tual distinction arising in the vanity-number case law strengthens the cybersquatter's argument
against finding commercial use.
153. Id. at 625-26.
154. Id. at 626.
155. Id. at 624-25; cf DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 932 (8th Cir.
2003). In DaimlerChrysler, the plaintiff sued the defendant for licensing a vanity number that
allegedly corresponded to the plaintiffs trademark. Id. at 935-36. The plaintiff argued that
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996), was analogous
to the case at bar, contending that like the domain-name context, the defendant was impeding
the plaintiff from exploiting the mark in the vanity-number context. Id. at 937. The plaintiff
was thus implicitly contending that the defendant made a commercial use of the mark merely
by securing the vanity number without a good-faith intent. Id. The court reasoned otherwise,
distinguishing Panavision because the plaintiff in DaimlerChrysler-unlike in Holiday Inns-
had not established that the vanity number was sufficiently similar to the mark so as to merit
trademark protection. Id. at 938. The court proceeded to rely on the reasoning of Holiday Inns
to further hold that even if the vanity number had been sufficiently similar to the mark, the
court could not find a commercial use because the defendant had not promoted or advertised
the good. Id. at 939.
Had the vanity number been sufficiently similar to the plaintiffs trademark, however, the
plaintiffs argument seems valid. Panavision does seem to lead to the conclusion that securing
a vanity number that is confusingly similar to a trademarked vanity-number constitutes com-
mercial use because it impedes the mark holder's ability to exploit its trademark. 945 F. Supp.
at 1304. Although the factual circumstances permitted the Eighth Circuit to distinguish
Panavision without having to address this issue, the plaintiff raised the apparent conflict be-
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The Toeppen cases clash with the "commercial use" principle as
stated in the vanity-number cases. Defendants who secure telephone
numbers that are confusingly similar to trademarked numbers for the
sole purpose of profiting from the misdialed number appear legally
indistinguishable from cybersquatters who register domain names for
the sole purpose of profiting from trademarked goods. As the vanity-
number courts have held, "impeding" a mark holder from using the
mark in a communications medium is not a commercial use. 156 It is
therefore incorrect for a court to consider whether that "use" results in
dilution. But the Toeppen decisions hold otherwise.
b. Selling a Domain Name
The second act to which the Toeppen cases attach trademark li-
ability is the cybersquatter's attempt to sell a domain name.' 57 Unlike
the former analysis of impeding a mark holder from using the Inter-
net, this act does constitute a commercial use: The cybersquatter of-
fers to sell a good, the domain name, which has a mark affixed to it.'
58
This act, however, does not satisfy the legal requirements to find con-
sumer confusion or dilution. Under the consumer-confusion doctrine,
a mark holder's rights are infringed only if a consumer would likely
associate the good sold by the unauthorized user with the mark
holder. 159 In a domain-name purchase, the circumstances of the sale
preclude this association. A cybersquatter's appearance conveys the
fact that he or she is not associated with the mark holder: a purchaser
contacts the cybersquatter at a location (geographic or virtual) that is
obviously unaffiliated with the mark holder. The person who pur-
chases "nike.com" from a cybersquatter does not believe that he or
she has actually bought a domain name belonging to Nike, Inc. Al-
though it is possible that the cybersquatter could pretend to be a rep-
resentative of Nike, Inc. (which would then change the analysis), in
all cases thus far, such a situation has never arisen. Moreover, the na-
ture of domain names leads any purchaser to the same conclusion.
tween the different meanings of commercial use in analogous contexts. See DaimlerChrysler,
315 F.3d at 937-38.
156. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
157. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303; Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227,
1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
158. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). It is noteworthy that to satisfy the "use in com-
merce" condition of § 1127, a cybersquatter must actually offer to sell the domain name; intent
alone is insufficient. See id
159. See id. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a).
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Purchasers know that registrants procure domain names through reg-
istrars on a first-come-first-serve basis without needing to show proof
of trademark ownership.' 60 The nature of the good itself, then, indi-
cates to a purchaser that the good that the cybersquatter offers to sell
the purchaser-the domain name-is not associated with the mark
holder.
An analogous situation to a cybersquatter selling domain names
would occur where a person sells name tags at a business convention
so that the various business attendees can identify themselves. The
name-tag seller would likely dress in apparel denoting that he or she
is an employee of the host convention center, as opposed to an em-
ployee of any particular business. Each name tag would have the
same general appearance, be written in the same font, cut the same
size, and dyed the same color. The only difference among the tags
would be that the letters spell different business names. Under these
circumstances, selling the name tags would not result in consumer
confusion as to whether the mark holder produced or sponsored the
name tag. A purchaser would be aware from the facts surrounding
the sale that the name tag did not represent a good associated with the
business printed on the name tag. The seller's appearance and the na-
ture of the good itself would indicate to the purchaser that the good
being sold was not sponsored by the mark holder. For the same rea-
son, a cybersquatter's sale of a domain name does not result in con-
sumer confusion.
Selling a domain name also does not result in dilution, i.e., a
lessening of the mark holder's ability to distinguish its goods or serv-
ices. For dilution to occur from the sale of a domain name, the sale
would have to blur or tarnish the purchaser's association of the mark
holder's good with the mark. 16 At the mention of the trademark, the
purchaser would have to conceive of the domain name as a good in
and of itself, symbolizing something that is distinct from the mark
holder's good or service.1 62 The purchaser would have to think of the
trademark as symbolizing the domain name itself.163 This situation
appears implausible. A purchaser seeks a domain name that contains
a mark because the domain name has the ability to serve as a locator
of a webpage. The purchaser acquires the domain name to procure
160. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:73.3.
161. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, §§ 24:68, 24:69.
162. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24:68.
163. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24:68.
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the sole right to a specific electronic identifier that points to a good or
service through a website. 164 A purchaser will not think of a domain
name containing a mark as a good, but rather as a device to identify
the good or service that the mark represents. Although a webpage
may detract from a mark holder's ability to identify the good or serv-
ice, the domain name itself does not. A domain name containing a
trademark does not lessen the mark holder's ability to identify its
good or service. Given that a cybersquatter does not post any com-
mercial website, the purchaser does not think of a product that is dis-
tinct from the mark when viewing the trademark in the domain name.
Analogously, the seller of name tags to business-convention at-
tendees does not dilute the trademark of any business listed on the
tags. By purchasing a name tag, an attendee does not associate the
mark with the tag. The reason that the attendee purchases the name
tag is to identify a person-not the tag itself-as being associated
with the business. The business listed on the name tag has not lost
any ability to distinguish its mark merely by the fact that the name tag
lists its trademarked name; the tag only serves as an indicator of the
trademark, not as a good that the mark symbolizes. Likewise, pur-
chasers of domain names do not conceive of the domain names as
goods that the mark symbolizes. The domain name containing a
trademark is viewed only as an indicator of a trademark without any
good attached. Selling a domain name does not result in the dilution
of a mark. The second domain-name use in the Toeppen cases-
selling the domain name--does not cause consumer confusion or di-
lution.
2. Courts Following the Lead of the Toeppen Cases
Despite the problematic nature of the commercial-use definition
in the Toeppen cases, some courts followed their lead and applied the
commercial-use doctrine to cybersquatting. In Planned Parenthood
Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, a pro-life advocate posted a
website with anti-abortion literature under a domain name that con-
tained the trademark of a pro-choice group. 165 The federal district
court found a commercial use of the domain name not based on the
164. Consistent with this argument is the fact that the only purchaser who would not
intend to post a website most likely seeks the domain name to preclude others from posting a
website. See, e.g., Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 499 (2d Cir.
2000) (procuring a domain name to preclude a competitor from posting a website).
165. No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997),
affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998).
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fact that the website promoted a good or service, but rather based on
the fact that the registrant affected the mark holder's ability to offer
its services over the Internet.' 66 Like the Toeppen cases, this reason-
ing fails to demonstrate that the registrant promoted any good or serv-
ice as required by § 1127.167 Under the court's rationale, mere regis-
tration without an attempt, or even without an intent, to sell the
domain name would qualify as a commercial use; impeding a mark
holder from using the mark in a domain name would satisfy the crite-
ria of Planned Parenthood168 And like the Toeppen cases, Planned
Parenthood has evolved into a landmark decision that other courts
have grasped onto where seemingly inequitable situations required re-
lief that conventional trademark principles fell short of providing. 
169
In Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky,170 a situation arose with facts simi-
lar to Planned Parenthood. The defendant posted a website that dis-
paraged a religious group, and used the religious group's trademark as
the website's domain name.171 Relying on Planned Parenthood, the
court found a commercial use because the defendant had prevented
the mark holder from "exploiting" its trademark, and because the reg-
istrant had inhibited Internet consumers from locating the mark
holder's website. 172 The same flawed reasoning of the Toeppen cases
166. Id. at *3 ("[D]efendant's actions affect plaintiff's ability to offer plaintiff's serv-
ices, which, as health and information services offered in forty-eight states and over the Inter-
net, are surely 'in commerce."'). The court also found a commercial use because of the fact
that the registrant posted a website. Id But the court did not state that the website needed to
promote or advertise a good or service to satisfy § 1127. Instead, the court reasoned that the
website constituted a commercial use of the domain name because Internet users accessed the
website through interstate telephone lines. Id. Like the court's other "use in commerce" ra-
tionale, this reasoning also falls short of satisfying the meaning of "use in commerce" as stated
in§ 1127.
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
168. Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313, at *3.
169. See, e.g., The N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assoc.,
Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). There, a district court found infringement where an
accountant set up a website using the trademark of his competitor as his domain name. Id. at
342. Notably, the accountant included a visible disclaimer in the website stating that the web-
site was not affiliated with the mark holder. Id. Under trademark law, an obvious disclaimer
usually precludes a finding of consumer confusion. See A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's
Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 227 (3d Cir. 2000). The Louis court rejected this principle in
the context of using a trademark in a domain name. 79 F. Supp. 2d at 342. Relying on
Planned Parenthood, the court reasoned that the disclaimer did not matter because an Internet
consumer who types in the trademark as a domain name expects to reach the mark holder's
website. Id.
170. 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998), affid, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998).
171. Id. at290-91.
172. Id. at 308. The court also found a commercial use based on the presence of a hy-
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carried the day.1
73
The Ninth Circuit has further developed the Toeppen cases' ra-
tionale so that liability hinges completely on the intent of the domain-
name registrant. 174 Whereas in the Toeppen cases the courts found
dilution based on the acts of impeding the mark holder from using the
domain name and of attempting to sell a domain name, 75 the Ninth
Circuit eventually dropped the judicial facade of seeming to reach a
decision based on a registrant's actions. 76 In Avery Dennison Corp.
v. Sumpton, the Ninth Circuit focused on the registrant's intent in de-
termining commercial use. 177 There, the Ninth Circuit faced a nearly
identical situation to the Toeppen cases: the defendants registered
thousands of domain names with the sole intent of selling them to
Internet users. 178 Yet the court distinguished this conduct from that of
the Toeppen cases on the basis that the defendants were selling do-
main names without considering their trademark value. 179  In the
words of the court, the defendants sold domain names "that hap-
pen[ed] to be trademarks for their non-trademark value."' 80 The de-
perlink to a website selling products, and the fact that the disparaging speech harmed the mark
holder's commercial business. Id.
173. Ironically, in both Planned Parenthood and Brodsky, the courts could have found a
commercial use without relying on the reasoning of the Toeppen cases. In both cases, the reg-
istrant had posted a website and had included a hyperlink to webpages advertising commercial
goods. Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313 at * 1-2; Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. at 290-91. This
indirect association with a sale of a good would likely have been sufficient given the liberal
interpretation of the commercial-use requirement. See Int'l Bancorp, L.L.C. v. Societe des
Bains de Mer et du Cercle, 329 F.3d 359, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2003) ("'[C]ommerce' under the
[Lanham] Act is coterminous with that commerce that Congress may regulate under the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution."). Instead, the reasoning of the Toeppen cases
prevailed.
A similar situation arose in Teletech Customer Care Management., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co.,
Inc., 977 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1997). There, the defendant, Tele-Tech, registered the
mark of the plaintiff under the domain name, "teletech.com"; the defendant then posted a web-
site about its engineering business. Id. at 1409-10. Relying on the Toeppen cases, the district
court found a commercial use because the defendant's use prevented the plaintiff from regis-
tering its trademark. Id. at 1411-12. The court failed to mention the fact that the defendant
was promoting a service on the website when it found a commercial use. As in Planned Par-
enthood and Brodsky, the court applied the faulty reasoning of the Toeppen cases, even where
an obvious situation ofdilutive commercial use was present.
174. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
175. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303-04 (C.D. Cal.
1996); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239-40 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
176. See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 880.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 872-73.
179. Id. at 880.
180. Id.
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fendants did not, the court explained, "use trademarks qua trade-
marks ... ,,181 Thus, according to Avery Dennison, the question of
whether a registrant uses a domain name in commerce turns on
whether a court believes that the defendant had the trademark in mind
when registering the domain name. 1
82
B. Legal Authority and Scholarly Commentary Rejecting the Toeppen
Cases
The problematic reasoning of the Toeppen line of cases has en-
gendered judicial and scholarly discussion. Before the enactment of
the ACPA, courts adopted rationales in trademark cases dealing with
domain names that contradicted the Toeppen cases' reasoning.'
83
Courts also explicitly rejected the Toeppen decisions. 84 Subsection 1
summarizes these cases. After the ACPA, courts and legal commen-
tators became more vocal in their disapproval of the Toeppen deci-
sions.185 Subsection 2 summarizes those post-ACPA criticisms.
1. Decisions Prior to the ACPA
Not all courts immediately accepted the reasoning of the Toep-
pen cases. 86  Given the innocuous nature of the uses at issue-
impeding a mark holder and attempting to sell a domain name-some
courts refused to find a "use in commerce" where the domain-name
registrant had not posted any website. For example, in HQM, Ltd. v.
Hatfield, the defendant registered a domain name containing a trade-
mark without posting a website. 187  Citing the Toeppen cases, the
mark holder argued that the registrant had diluted its mark because its
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. See, e.g., HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500, 509 (D. Md. 1999); Juno On-
line Servs., L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
184. See, e.g., HQM, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 508-09.
185. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 652-53
(E.D. Mich. 2001); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:77 ("Passage... of [the ACPA] made
dilution by cybersquatting largely obsolete. In fact, it may no longer be usable at all.").
186. See, e.g., HQM, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 508-09; Juno, 979 F. Supp. at 691; accord Jen-
nifer Golinveaux, What's in a Domain Name: Is "Cybersquatting'" Trademark Dilution?, 33
U.S.F.L. REv. 641, 671 (1999) (concluding that courts have misapplied the commercial-use
requirement to extend federal dilution law to enjoin cybersquatting); Steven R. Borgman, The
New Federal Cybersquatting Laws, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 265, 267 (2000) (questioning
how registering a domain name would constitute "use" of a mark sufficient to create a likeli-
hood of confusion, or to dilute a trademark).
187. 71 F. Supp. 2d at 504. The defendant used the domain name for email purposes.
Id at 505.
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customers might have been unable to locate the mark holder's web-
site, thereby diminishing the capacity of the mark holder to identify
and distinguish its goods on the Internet.' 88 The court disagreed, ex-
plicitly rejecting the reasoning of the Toeppen cases, and stating that
the mark holder's argument "treads dangerously close to establishing
a property right-in-gross in cyberspace."1 89 Similarly, in Juno Online
Services, L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., the court held that registering a
domain name containing a trademark "in hopes of reselling it" to the
mark holder was insufficient to find that the registrant had committed
a use in commerce.190 The court opined that the registrant was merely
"warehousing" the domain name, and that the "use in commerce" re-
quirement "would only be fulfilled if the defendant were to use the
Internet," such that the registrant "used or displayed the mark in the
sale or advertising of services."'191
One Ninth Circuit case also appears to conflict with the reason-
ing of the Toeppen cases. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West
Coast Entertainment Corp. is instructive on commercial uses in the
domain-name context. 92 There, the defendant, West Coast, regis-
tered "moviebuff.com" as a domain name. 193 West Coast's motiva-
tion for choosing that domain name was suspect because its competi-
tor, Brookfield, had used the term as a description of its products
years before West Coast acquired the domain name. ' 94 After West
Coast had registered "moviebuff.com," Brookfield obtained a federal
trademark on "MovieBuff."' 95 Two years later, West Coast publicly
announced that it intended to launch a website at "moviebuff.com,"
and Brookfield then sought to enjoin West Coast from using the do-
main name. 196 West Coast argued that it had priority to the term
"MovieBuff' because it had registered the term as a domain name be-
fore Brookfield applied for a federal trademark. 197 The Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument, reasoning that West Coast had not used the
term in commerce under § 1127 when West Coast registered the term
188. Id. at 508.
189. Id. at 509.
190. 979 F. Supp. 684, 691-92 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
191. Id. at 691 (internal quotations omitted).
192. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
193. Id. at 1042.
194. Id. at 1041-42.
195. Id. at 1042.
196. Id. at 1042-43.
197. Id. at 1050-51.
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as a domain name. 198 The court explained: "[A] mark cannot serve a
source-identifying function if the public has never seen the mark and
thus [the mark] is not meritorious of trademark protection until it is
used in public in a manner that creates an association among consum-
ers between the mark and the mark's owner."'199 Accordingly, the
court held that West Coast did not use "MovieBuff' in commerce by
registering "moviebuff.com."
200
This rejection of West Coast's argument is particularly notewor-
thy because the circumstances suggested that West Coast registered
the domain name with a bad-faith intent.2° 1 West Coast appears to
have registered it with the intent to block Brookfield from employing
its own term as a domain name.20 2 Although West Coast did not ad-
mit to this purpose, it seems evident that West Coast initially only
registered "moviebuff.com" because that was the term by which its
competitor, Brookfield, described its products.0 3 Indeed, Brookfield
held a state trademark (but not federal) on the term before West Coast
198. Id. at 1051-52.
199. Id. at 105 1. When the court considered whether West Coast could use the Movie-
Buff term in its metatag-rather than in its domain name-the court expressed a view that
could be construed as inconsistent with its position on the commercial use of a domain name.
Id. at 1062. The court stated that "by using 'moviebuff.com' or 'MovieBuff [in its metatag]
to divert people looking for 'MovieBuff' to its web site, West Coast improperly benefits from
the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its mark." Id. Other courts have attempted to apply
this statement in the domain-name context to mean that by using a trademark in a domain
name to divert people looking for the mark holder's website, a registrant improperly benefits.
See, e.g., The N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assoc., Inc., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Applying the statement to domain names rather than to
metatags undermines the argument that a registrant must post a website to be liable.
The statement, however, can apply only in the metatag context-not in the domain-name
context. In diverting Internet consumers from a website by using a metatag, a registrant ac-
tively broadcasts the metatag to Internet consumers through the mechanisms of a search en-
gine. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:69. This use of a metatag, then, actively pro-
motes and advances the registrant's website. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:69.
Accordingly, just as West Coast's website promoted commercial goods, its use of the trade-
mark in the metatag constituted active conduct to promote its website, and thereby its goods.
See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:69. That is, West Coast promoted its goods when it
actively diverted customers from Brookfield through its metatags. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at
1062. In contrast, a domain-name registrant does not promote any good or service if the regis-
trant merely chooses not to do anything with its domain name. Id at 1052. Unlike the meta-
tag context, the diversion of customers in the domain-name context does not constitute a
commercial use. Id. at 1051.
200. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1052.
201. See id. at 1041-42.
202. See id at 1042.
203. See id
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registered the domain name.2 °4 West Coast therefore likely had a
bad-faith intent when it registered the domain name. The apparent
bad-faith intent, however, was insufficient for the court to find a
commercial use.2 °5 Brookfield thus demonstrates the problematic rea-
soning in the Toeppen cases. 20 6 To be liable for registering a domain
name containing a trademark, a registrant must use that mark within
the domain name to promote a product or service to the public, re-
gardless of the registrant's bad-faith intent.20 7 The reasoning of the
Toeppen cases is inconsistent with this simple principle.20 8
Further support exists for the conclusion that the Toeppen deci-
sions were incorrectly decided. That support arises where courts have
found dilution based on the fact that a registrant had posted a website
at the domain name.20 9 A website containing pornographic material
attached to a domain name containing a trademark has given rise to
numerous dilution suits.2 1°  Courts held that viewing pornographic
material at the website associated with the domain name containing
the mark dilutes a consumer's image of a child's board game,211 a
children's toy store,212 and the Pope's visit to America. 13 Blurring
and tarnishment result from this use of a mark in a domain name.
Courts have similarly found a violation of the consumer-
204. Id.
205. See id. at 1052.
206. Another point from Brookfield is worth noting. The court held that not until West
Coast publicly announced its intent to launch a website at "moviebuff.com" did West Coast
use the domain name, and thereby the mark contained therein, in commerce. Id. at 1053.
Thus, a rare instance arose where, in accordance with § 1127, a domain-name registrant made
a commercial use of a mark through a domain name without actually posting a website. See
id. The public announcement of the domain name was a commercial use because it promoted
West Coast's goods. Id at 1052-53. Nevertheless, this holding bolsters the argument that the
property rights of a mark holder do not include a right to a domain name without the registrant
making some sort of broadcast of the domain name to the public. Absent the unusual circum-
stances in Brookfield, such a broadcast occurs only through a website.
207. See id. at 1052.
208. See discussion supra Part III.A.
209. See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1479
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding dilution where defendant used similar version of famous trade-
mark as domain name, and then posted pornography at the corresponding website); Toys 'R'
Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same); Archdiocese of St.
Louis v. Internet Entm't Group, Inc., No. 4:99CV27SNL, 1999 WL 66022, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 12, 1999) (same) (opinion withdrawn at request of the court).
210. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 209.
211. Hasbro, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1480.
212. Toys 'R'Us, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1838.
213. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 1999 WL 66022, at * 1.
[41:1
2005] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING ACT 33
confusion doctrine based on registrants having posted a commercial
website at a domain name.214 Beginning in 1996, courts found in-
fringement on the grounds that an Internet consumer would likely
confuse the source of a mark with a website attached to a domain
name containing the mark.2t 5  Six examples follow. First, in Comp
Examiner Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc., a company owned a trademark
on the term, "JURIS," and a second company registered "juris.com"
216as a domain name. On its website, the second company advertised
goods and services toward the same market of consumers with which
the first company did business.217 The court granted the first com-
pany a preliminary injunction enjoining that use of the domain
name. 218  Second, in Cardservice International, Inc. v. McGee, the
court considered whether the defendant's use of "cardservice.com"
infringed on the plaintiffs trademark, "Cardservice International. 21 9
Both parties competed for similar credit-card clientele; both operated
websites displaying information about their respective services.22 °
The court held that consumer confusion would likely result from the
defendant's use of the domain name because upon arriving at the
website for "cardservice.com," an Internet consumer might believe
214. Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int'l Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (N.D. Cal. 1999);
Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D. Va. 1999),
aff'd, 217 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 2000); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Nexus Energy Software, Inc., 36
F. Supp. 2d 436 (D. Mass. 1999); Green Prods. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Prods. Co., 992
F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va.
1997), aff'd, 129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir. 1997); Comp Exam'r Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc., No. 96-
0213-WMB (CTx), 1996 WL 376600 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1996).
215. After Congress passed the ACPA, courts continued to find dilution in a manner
suggesting that a defendant must post a commercial website in order to find infringement. See,
e.g., Int'l Bancorp, L.L.C. v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle, 329 F.3d 359, 382 (4th
Cir. 2003) (finding infringement because the domain name incorporated a trademark and the
registrant posted a website with pictures and renderings of the mark holder's goods); Eurotech,
Inc. v. Cosmos European Travels Aktiengesellschaft 213 F. Supp. 2d 612, 619 (E.D. Va.
2002) (ruling that the use of trademark in website constituted infringement because "maintain-
ing a website that provides commercial information originally supplied by third-party compa-
nies clearly satisfies the 'use in commerce' requirement"); Victoria's Cyber Secret Ltd. P'ship
v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that domain
name infringes on trademark because websites concern similar products); Zipee Corp. v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1087 (D. Or. 2000) (finding infringement where defendant




218. Id. at* 1-2.
219. 950 F. Supp. at 740-41.
220. Id. at 741.
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the website belonged to the mark holder. 221 Third, in Green Products
Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co., the court held that con-
sumers would likely be confused when they arrived at the website of
the defendant, which used the plaintiffs trademark in its domain
name, and discovered that the website did not belong to the plain-
tiff.222 Fourth, in Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. Nexus Energy
Software, the court enjoined the defendant from using the trademark
"energyplace" in its domain name.223 The court reasoned that because
both parties targeted the same consumer group, consumers would be
confused when viewing the defendant's website after typing the plain-
tiff's trademark as the domain name. 24 Fifth, in Washington Speak-
ers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc., the defendant registered
a domain name containing a business competitor's trademark, and
then posted a website offering competing services.225 Issuing a
lengthy and well-reasoned opinion, the court concluded that this "use"
was infringing.226 Sixth, in Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup International
Ltd., the court found a likelihood of confusion where the defendant
registered "americascup.org" and then posted material on the website
so that it appeared as though it was the official website of the Amer-
ica's Cup event.227 The plaintiff held a trademark on the term "Amer-
ica's Cup" and a website at the domain name "americascup.org.
' 228
Because the information available on the defendant's website was
similar to the information on the plaintiffs website, the court found a
clear instance of consumer confusion.229 Thus, the rationale for find-
ing consumer confusion in each of these decisions hinges on a regis-
trant posting a commercial website. The cases therefore suggest that
a cybersquatter, who by definition posts no commercial website, does
not violate a mark holder's trademark rights.
2. Authority and Commentary Subsequent to the ACPA
Once the ACPA came into being, legal commentators and courts
more readily acknowledged the shortcomings of the dilution and in-
221. Id.
222. 992 F. Supp. at 1078.
223. 36 F. Supp. 2d at 439-40.
224. Id.
225. 33 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93.
226. Id. at 493-502.
227. 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
228. Id. at 1107.
229. Id. at 1115.
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fringement doctrines in prohibiting cybersquatting. 230  Professor
McCarthy now recognizes that "there is a very poor fit between the
actions of a cybersquatter and the federal Anti-dilution Act....
[T]here is no traditional dilution by blurring or tarnishment. ' ' 231 Pro-
fessor McCarthy further teaches: "Passage of [the ACPA] made dilu-
tion by cybersquatting largely obsolete. In fact, it may no longer be
usable at all."232  In Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., a
federal district court provided a thorough exegesis explaining why
traditional trademark law fails to prevent cybersquatting.233 The court
stated in relevant part:
While the distinction between an intentional cybersquatter's repre-
hensible conduct and another's unintentional tying up of a pro-
tected trademark is logical, subjective intent is not an appropriate
consideration under the dilution or infringement statutes.... The
theory that a defendant's use of a trademark as a domain name
constitutes "dilution" only when the defendant is acting with intent
to profit from the domain name's status as a trademark is flawed.
Use of a trademark as a domain name by someone other than the
mark holder-regardless for what purpose-always has the "dilu-
tive" effect complained of in Panavision: (1) it precludes the mark
holder from using the website that it believes the customers will
locate most easily and (2) it subjects the mark holder's name and
reputation to the mercy of the domain name registrant.... [E]ven
mere registration of a trademark as [a] domain name, which most
courts-including the Panavision court-have found non-
actionable under the [dilution statute], has the same "dilutive" ef-
fect described in Panavision with regard to trafficking.
234
The above quotation thus opines that the subjective-intent ele-
ment that was unavoidably necessary to find a cybersquatter liable
does not cohere with the dilution or infringement doctrines. 235 Be-
cause the dilution doctrine "should provide a remedy regardless of the
230. See, e.g., PGC Prop., L.L.C. v. Wainscott/Sagaponack Prop. Owners, Inc., 250 F.
Supp. 2d 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (refusing to apply the Planned Parenthood rationale of finding
a commercial use despite the fact that the defendant was impeding Internet consumers from
reaching the mark holder's website); Steven R. Borgman, The New Federal Cybersquatting
Laws, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 265 (2000). But see Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d
424 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (finding liability under likelihood-of-confusion doctrine for cybersquat-
ting conduct).
231. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 25:77.
232. Id.
233. 177 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
234. Id. at 652-53.
235. Id.
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domain name registrant's subjective intent," the court reasoned that
even mere registration would constitute dilution, and this is a proposi-
tion nearly all courts have rejected.236
As in Greatdomains.com, in Strick Corp. v. Strickland, a federal
district court rejected the argument that impeding a mark holder from
using the domain name is dilution.237 The court explicitly disap-
proved of the rationale that dilution occurs when Internet consumers
are unable to reach the mark holder's website after typing in a trade-
mark as the domain name.2 38 Noting that although a domain-name
search could "rise to the level of inconvenience," the court concluded
that this inconvenience is not as "cognizable" as it is "trivial" in view
of the fact that Internet search engines usually reference the mark
holder's website as the first or second listing.239 The court observed




The Second and Seventh Circuits have also acknowledged the
failing of traditional trademark doctrines in prohibiting cybersquat-
ting.241 The Second Circuit stated that the ACPA "was adopted spe-
cifically to provide courts with a preferable alternative to stretching
federal dilution law when dealing with cybersquatting cases. 242 In
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, the Seventh Circuit implicitly rejected the hold-
ing of Panavision (one of the Toeppen cases) as it considered whether
a registrant's use of "bargainbeanies.com" diluted the trademark
"Beanie Babies." 243 The court acknowledged Panavision's commer-
cial-use definition, which did not fit under the traditional doctrine of
dilution, and then chose not to apply that rationale in the case before
236. Id. at 653-54. The court also rejected the stated reasoning in Planned Parenthood.
Id. at 655. The court recognized that while Planned Parenthood reached the correct outcome
because of the infringing website, it misstated trademark law to reach this outcome. Id. The
court therefore treated the Planned Parenthood rationale as unsupported dicta. Id
237. 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 379-80 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 379.
240. Id.
241. See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002); Sporty's Farm v. Sports-
man's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit has declined to comment
as to whether Panavision remains good law. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communica-
tions Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e need not reach the parties' arguments
regarding whether Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen applies, whether it created a new
species of dilution, or whether it remains valid after Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act of 1999.").
242. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497 (emphasis added).
243. 306 F.3d at 514.
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it, instead analyzing the commercial-use requirement according to the
244registrant's sale of products over the website.
Finally, the legislative history of the ACPA indicates that tradi-
tional doctrines of trademark law do not prohibit cybersquatting.
245
The legislative history states: "[c]urrent law does not expressly pro-
hibit the act of cybersquatting.... Instances of cybersquatting con-
tinue to grow each year because there is no clear deterrent .... ,,246
Thus, legal commentators, courts, and the legislative history of
the ACPA have all recognized the failing of traditional trademark
doctrines in thwarting the practice of cybersquatting. As stated
above, courts universally rejected the view that the mere registration
of a domain name, without "more," constitutes commercial use.247
The Toeppen line of cases defined the "more" to be the act of imped-
ing a mark holder from registering a domain name containing the
mark, thereby preserving domain names for mark holders.248  As
courts and commentators have concluded, however, this definition
exceeded the property rights with which trademark law endowed
mark holders.
IV. THE ACPA AND THE ABOLISHMENT OF CYBERSQUATTING
In November 1999, Congress relieved the legal tension that had
surrounded judicial attempts of obstructing the practice of cybersquat-
ting by passing the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.249
The ACPA effectively prohibits the practice of cybersquatting.250 It
prevents a registrant from owning a domain name, which contains a
trademark, with the intent to profit from the mark.25' Part IV de-
scribes characteristics of the statute and the circumstances under
which courts have applied it. Subpart A provides a statutory analysis;
244. Id. at 512-13. Like the Seventh Circuit, the Sixth Circuit has implicitly rejected
the reasoning of the Panavision and Intermatic line of cases. PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan
Tech., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003). In PACCAR, the Sixth Circuit noted that the "key
issue" under a likelihood-of-confusion analysis is "whether [a defendant's] use of the...
trademarks in its domain names is likely to cause confusion among consumers regarding the
source or sponsorship of the web sites." Id. at 250-51 (emphasis added).
245. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999).
246. Id.
247. See cases cited supra note 116.
248. See cases cited supra note 126.
249. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
113 Stat. 1501A-545 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000)).
250. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4.
251. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
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subpart B provides a description of its judicial application. Part IV
does not criticize the ACPA on constitutional grounds, but rather sets
forth its statutory meaning and history of judicial application. The
conclusion of Part IV is that the ACPA prohibits cybersquatting by
punishing domain-name registrants for their intent in owning the do-
main name; the statute avoids the legal tension that the Toeppen cases
created in the area of trademark law.
A. Statutory Analysis
The ACPA imposes liability if a person (1) has a bad-faith intent
to profit from a mark,252 and (2) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain
name containing a trademark. 3  The remedy for being liable under
these conditions includes the transfer of the domain name at issue.254
The following Subsection 1 discusses these two conditions of liabil-
ity; Subsection 2 discusses this remedy.
1. Conditions for Liability
The first condition of liability under the ACPA is that a regis-
trant must have a bad-faith intent to profit from a mark. 5  Courts ex-
amine the behavior or speech of a registrant to determine if the regis-
trant has a bad-faith intent.256  The ACPA lists nine factors that
provide guidance for a court to make this determination.257 The stat-
252. The legislative history describes the essential element of bad faith as an "intent to
trade on the goodwill of another's mark." S. REP. No. 106-140, at 9.
253. The ACPA states in relevant part:
(1)(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard to
the goods or services of the parties, that person-
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name
which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that-
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the
domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration
of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of
that mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of
Title 18 or section 220506 of Title 36.
15 U.S.C. § 1 125(d)(1)(A) (2000).
254. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i).
255. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
256. See id § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(IX).
257. Id.
[41:1
2005] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING ACT 39
ute provides that courts are "not limited to" the nine factors. 8  Five
of the nine factors denote circumstances indicative of a bad-faith in-
tent; the other four indicate a good-faith intent.259  The five factors
denoting a bad-faith intent consist of the following: Factor V-
intending to divert consumers from the mark holder's website to the
registrant's website through the disputed domain name; Factor VI-
offering to transfer or sell the domain name to the mark holder or any
third party for financial gain; Factor VII-providing false contact in-
formation when registering a domain name, or alternatively, inten-
tionally failing to keep the contact information accurate; Factor
VIII-acquiring multiple domain names with a knowledge that they
are identical or confusingly similar to distinctive marks of others;
Factor IX-incorporating a mark into the disputed domain name that
is highly distinctive and famous.260 Notably, the ACPA does not pro-
hibit the conduct listed in these five factors. 261 Rather, it prohibits the
258. Id. § 1 125(d)(1)(B)(i); see also S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 15 (1999) ("[The ACPA]
provides a court with the necessary discretion to recognize the evidence of bad-faith when it is
present.").
259. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 13-14 (1999).
260. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(I)(B)(i)(V)-(IX). The ACPA states in relevant part:
In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described under subparagraph
(A), a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to...
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online loca-
tion to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill
represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tar-
nish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the
source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to
the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or
having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any
goods or services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such
conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact informa-
tion when applying for the registration of the domain name, the person's inten-
tional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person's prior
conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which
the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that
are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of
famous marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of such do-
main names, without regard to the goods or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain name
registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsec-
tion (c)(1) of this section.
Id.
261. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 15 (stating that while the intent to sell a domain name
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intent that a court infers from those factors. For instance, selling a
domain name containing a trademark is not illegal under the ACPA,
whereas the intent that a court may infer from that action is.262
A final point about the bad-faith-intent condition of liability
should be noted: the condition does not require any "commercial use"
of the mark.263 Unlike the traditional trademark doctrines of dilution
and infringement, the ACPA does not require an examination as to
whether a defendant has made a commercial use of the mark as de-
fined in § 1127.264 Nowhere does the ACPA even mention the term
commercial use. 265 Instead, the statute requires an examination of a
registrant's purpose for possessing the domain name.266
The second condition of liability-that a person register, traffic,
or use a domain name-is nothing more than a condition requiring
that a person be in possession of a domain name. This conclusion fol-
lows from three premises. First, if a person possesses a domain name,
the person must have registered or trafficked in the domain name. A
containing a trademark is actionable, a registrant could sell such a domain name without being
liable if the registrant did so without a bad-faith intent).
262. Id.
263. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). Although courts have refrained from explicitly
stating this conclusion, they have intimated as much. See, e.g., TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368
F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2004) (comparing the commercial-use requirement under dilution to
the ACPA and commenting that the "ACPA's language does not contain such a specific com-
mercial-use requirement," yet declining to hold that the ACPA does not require a commercial
use); Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 809 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Al-
though there is some dispute between the parties as to whether the ACPA covers non-
commercial activity, we see no reason to consider these arguments, as the statute directs a re-
viewing court to consider only a defendant's 'bad faith intent to profit' from the use of a mark
held by another party."); cf E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs, Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 276 n.3
(5th Cir. 2002) (declining to reach the issue of whether the registrant's use of the mark was
commercial); accord Siegrun D. Kane, Trademark Infringement Litigation 2004: "Lost in
Translation, " in COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK LAW FOR THE NONSPECIALIST UNDER-
STANDING THE BASICS 2004 A SATELLITE PROGRAM, at 373, 450 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course, Handbook Series No. 4368, 2004) ("Use in com-
merce is not required [under the ACPA].").
264. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
265. See id It is further arguable that the ACPA not only fails to require commercial
use in attaching liability, but it in fact excuses liability if a registrant commits a commercial
use. Under Factor III, a court is to consider the fact that a registrant has made a prior use of
the domain name that is "in connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services."
Id. § 1 125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III). If the registrant's use is in connection with a bona fide offering of
any goods or services, or in other words if the registrant's use is commercial, then the court is
to find that this factor weighs against finding a bad-faith intent. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at
13 (1999) ("The first four [Factors] suggest circumstances that may tend to indicate an absence
of bad-faith intent .... ).
266. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
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person can acquire exclusive rights of use to a domain name either by
registering a domain name, or by receiving those rights through a
transfer. The exclusive rights of use-or in other words, posses-
sion-thus arise only through registration or transfer. Transfer of
those rights appears synonymous with the meaning of "traffic, 2 67 so
any person in possession of a domain name has either registered or
trafficked in that domain name.
Second, the ACPA states the bad-faith-intent condition inde-
pendently of the registration-traffic-or-use condition.268 That is, the
ACPA connects the two conditions for liability with only the word
"and": a registrant is liable if he or she has a bad-faith intent, "and' if
the registrant registers, traffics, or uses a domain name containing a
trademark. 269  According to the language of the statute, a person
would be liable if the person were to register a domain name contain-
ing a mark, and then two years later intended to profit from the mark
within the domain name.270 As the Second Circuit stated: "The 'bad
faith intent to profit' element of a trademark rights-holder's ACPA
claim may be premised on the domain-name registrant's ongoing use
of the domain name.",27 1 The ACPA attaches liability for a bad-faith
intent even after the registrant has registered, trafficked in, or used a
domain name.272 The statute does not suggest that the two conditions
must occur simultaneously.273 Because the statute does not indicate
any temporal relation between the two conditions, they can occur at
different times and a registrant will still be liable.
Third, the ACPA applies retroactively. 274 A statutory note to the
ACPA provides that the statute "shall apply to all domain names reg-
267. The ACPA defines "traffics in" to mean conducting "transactions that include, but
are not limited to, sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and any
other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration." Id. § 1125(d)(1)(E).
Admittedly, a registrant could receive possession of a domain name through a transfer for
which he or she did not pay consideration. A registrant could be given a domain name as a
gift. That registrant would not have actually registered the domain name, nor would he or she
have paid consideration for it. The few instances where a person receives a domain name as a
gift therefore fall outside the scope of this Article.
268. See id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (connecting the two conditions with "and").
269. Id. (emphasis added).
270. See Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 374 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding
that a defendant's offer to sell a domain name, even after registering the domain name with a
good-faith intent, was actionable under the ACPA).
271. Id.
272. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
273. See id.
274. Id. § 1117 (statutory note); see also BADGLEY, supra note 11, § 4.06[A].
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istered before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this
Act.... , 275  The fact that a registrant has registered a domain name
prior to the ACPA does not preclude the registrant from being li-
able.276
Together, these three premises demonstrate that the second
stated condition-that a person register, traffic, or use a domain
name-is satisfied merely by a registrant possessing a domain name.
The argument can be summarized as follows: (1) any person in pos-
session of a domain name will have registered or trafficked in the
domain name; (2) the fact that the registrant has registered or traf-
ficked in the domain name without a bad-faith intent is immaterial in
evaluating the second condition of liability; and (3) the fact that the
registrant registered or trafficked in the domain name prior to the en-
actment of the ACPA is also immaterial in evaluating that condition.
A person in possession of a domain name, i.e., a registrant, therefore
satisfies the second stated condition for being liable under the ACPA.
2. Transferring Domain Names as a Remedy Under the ACPA
The ACPA provides an injunctive remedy for a mark holder.
277
The statute allows a court to transfer a domain name from a registrant
to a mark holder.278 This remedy is unavailable to mark holders under
the doctrines of infringement and dilution.279 Under dilution and in-
fringement, a court can only enjoin a defendant from using a mark.28 °
In contrast, the ACPA states that a court may order "the transfer of
the domain name to the owner of the mark.",28' Prior to the ACPA,
then, trademark law only allowed courts to enjoin an infringer from
275. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (statutory note).
276. See, e.g., Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, 202 F.3d 489, 495, 502 (2d
Cir. 2000) (applying the ACPA to a registrant who registered the domain name prior to the
ACPA's enactment).
277. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i).
278. Id.
279. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(2)(B), 1125(c)(1).
280. Section 1114(2) limits the injunctive remedy for trademark infringement to "an
injunction against the [infringing] presentation .... 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(B). Likewise, §
1125(c) limits the injunctive remedy for dilution to "an injunction against another person's
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name...." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). The fed-
eral district court for the Eastern District of Virginia recognized that these trademark doctrines
did not allow a court to order a defendant to transfer ownership of a domain name to a mark
holder. The court held that these doctrines only allowed the court to order a defendant to cease
using the domain name. Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d
496 (E.D. Va. 1999).
281. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) (emphasis added).
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using a mark. 82 Now, the ACPA allows courts to enjoin a registrant
from using a domain name, and to transfer the rights of use to a do-
main name to the mark holder.283
The Fourth Circuit considered this distinction in Porsche Cars
North America, Inc. v. Porsche.net, et al.2 84  There, the plaintiff
sought a transfer of a domain name as a remedy under dilution law.
2 85
The court rejected this remedy as being appropriate for dilution, stat-
ing that "[a] trademark-dilution action under § 1125(c)... simply
cannot afford [the plaintiff] the only remedy it seeks in this case-
transfer of the defendant domain names.... [N]othing in § 1125(c)
alone entitles a plaintiff to possess the offending materials. 286 The
court contrasted this with the ACPA, which "does authorize transfer
of a domain name as relief. ... ,, 287 Thus, the ACPA provides a rem-
edy that transfers all rights of use to a domain name from a registrant
to a mark holder, which rights the mark holder does not otherwise
possess.288
B. Judicial Application of the ACPA
Beginning with Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market,
courts have stripped a registrant of a domain name based solely on the
registrant's purpose for possessing the domain name.28 9 In Sporty's
Farm, the defendant apparently registered a domain name to preclude
its competitor from registering the competitor's own mark.2 90  Even
though the ACPA's five bad-faith factors do not address this particu-
lar intent, the Second Circuit applied the ACPA because, in the
court's view, precluding a competitor from registering a domain name
282. See sources cited supra note 280.
283. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i).
284. 302 F.3d 248, 260-62 (4th Cir. 2002).
285. Id. at 260.
286. Id. at 261.
287. Id.
288. See Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 380 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
("[N]othing in trademark law requires that title to domain names that incorporate trademarks
or portions of trademarks be provided to trademark holders.") (internal quotations omitted).
289. 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000).
290. Id. at 499 ("[The defendant] registered [the domain name] for the primary purpose
of keeping [the plaintiff] from using that domain name."). But see Brookfield Communica-
tions, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding no com-
mercial use where the defendant registered a domain name to apparently preclude its competi-
tor from using the domain name).
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demonstrated bad faith.29'
Decisions following Sporty's Farm confirmed the meaning of
the ACPA: a registrant's intent determines whether the registrant
holds valid rights of use to the domain name.292 In Northern Light
Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, the First Circuit considered
whether using "northernlights.com" as an email address violated the
ACPA where a mark holder held a trademark on "Northern Light." 2
93
The court held that this use of the domain name did violate the
ACPA, not because of a bad-faith intent specific to the trademark at
issue, but rather because of a bad-faith intent inferred from the fact
that the registrant had registered other domain names that incorpo-
rated famous marks.294 In Shields v. Zuccarini, the Third Circuit held
that registering a domain name that was one letter different from the
mark holder's website violated the ACPA because it manifested an
intent to divert Internet consumers from the mark holder's website.295
The Fourth Circuit also found an ACPA violation in People for Ethi-
cal Treatment of Animals v. Doughney.296 There, the registrant had
prevented a mark holder from using its own trademark, thereby mani-
291. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499.
292. See, e.g., Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428-30 (M.D.N.C. 2003)
(finding bad-faith intent because defendant registered over 8,000 domain names, many of
which corresponded to famous trademarks); Victoria's Cyber Secret Ltd. P'ship v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1347-49 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (finding bad-faith intent
based on registrant's intent to divert customers from mark holder's site); Ford Motor Co. v.
Lapertosa, 126 F. Supp. 2d 463, 465-66 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (same); Morrison & Foerster L.L.P.
v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1133, 1136 (D. Col. 2000) (suggesting that although cyber-
squatter's conduct likely neither dilutive nor infringing, the fact that he registered the domain
names out of spite towards the mark holder constituted bad faith under ACPA); Zipee Corp. v.
United States Postal Servs., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1087 (D. Or. 2000) (finding bad faith be-
cause defendant registered other domain names that corresponded to famous marks); cf Retail
Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ'g, 247 F. Supp. 2d 822, 828-29 (E.D. Va. 2003) (refusing to find
bad-faith intent because domain-name registrant intended to use the domain name in com-
merce and had no intent to extort money from mark holder), aff'd, 364 F.3d 535 (4th Cir.
2004); Hartog & Co. v. Swix.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539-42 (E.D. Va. 2001) (same).
293. 236 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 2001). The registrant later posted a website at "nothem-
lights.com" that listed various businesses that could be associated with the term "Northern
Lights Community." Id. at 59. The mark holder's business was listed with a link to its web-
site. Id.
294. Id. at 65.
295. 254 F.3d 476, 482-84 (3d Cir. 2001). Contra TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433,
435, 440 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that no evidence existed that defendant intended to divert
customers from mark holder's site even though defendant's domain name contained the trade-
mark without any spelling differentiation). The Third Circuit also found an ACPA violation in
Schmidheiny v. Weber because the cybersquatter intended to sell a domain name that spelled
the name of a famous billionaire. 319 F.3d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 2003).
296. 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
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festing a bad-faith intent.297 The Fifth Circuit followed suit in E. & J.
Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs, Ltd., holding a cybersquatter liable be-
cause it attempted to sell other domain names containing famous
marks.298
Two recent appellate decisions have further emphasized the
broad reach of the ACPA. In Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., the de-
fendant registered 20 musical-instrument domain names, including
"cello.com." 299 The plaintiff held a trademark on "Cello" for use in
the audio equipment business; the plaintiff brought a trademark action
against the defendant, and then discontinued the litigation.3"0 At that
point, the defendant offered to sell the domain name to the plaintiff.30 1
The Second Circuit held that the defendant's attempt to sell the do-
main name, even after litigation ceased, could violate the ACPA.3 °2
Thus, Storey precludes a registrant from ever attempting to sell a do-
main name that incorporates a trademark. Any attempt, even if the
original purpose of registering the domain name is not in "bad faith,"
constitutes a violation of the ACPA.30 3 Similarly, in Virtual Works,
Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., the Fourth Circuit found an
ACPA violation where the defendant merely contemplated selling its
domain name "vw.net" to the mark holder when it registered the do-
main name for its own business, Virtual Works.3 04 The court noted
that ACPA liability is a "question of intent," independent of the fair
use that may be occurring in conjunction with that intent.
305
As these cases illustrate, the ACPA effectively attaches liability
for a mental intent that the Toeppen line of cases condemned. Despite
the fact that courts and legal commentators have rejected the Toeppen
cases' application of dilution to cybersquatting, in the end, the policy
297. Id. at 362-63, 369.
298. 286 F.3d 270, 275-76 (5th Cir. 2002).
299. 347 F.3d 370, 374 (2d Cir. 2003).
300. Id. at 374-75.
301. Id. at 375.
302. Id. at 385-86.
303. Cf Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir.
2002) (distinguishing between an offer to sell by a domain-name registrant and an offer to sell
by a domain-name registrant's attorney).
The Second Circuit's interpretation of the ACPA contravenes the interpretation that the
legislative history sets forth. The legislative history states that "someone who has a legitimate
registration of a domain name that mirrors someone else's domain name, such as a trademark
owner... may, in fact, wish to sell that name to the other trademark owner. This bill does not
imply that these facts are an indication of bad-faith." S. REP. No. 106-140, at 15 (1999).
304. 238 F.3d 264, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2001).
305. Id. at 269.
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of the Toeppen cases has prevailed. The ACPA effectively adopts
their holding-stripping registrants of domain names based on their
intent.30 6 Courts now enjoy a legal means for finding liability based
on a registrant's subjective intent.30 7 Where a person registers a do-
main name, and either at the time of registration or subsequent to that
time,30 8 intends to in some way impede the mark holder from register-
ing the mark as a domain name, then trademark liability exists under
the ACPA.3 9  Although the Toeppen line of cases mislabeled the
conduct as violating dilution and infringement doctrines, their policy
of examining intent to determine a property right persists. The hold-
ings of the Toeppen line of cases are essentially embodied within the
ACPA.31°
V. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACPA
Although the ACPA has proven to be an effective means for
abolishing the practice of cybersquatting, it has one egregious flaw.
The statute violates the Takings Clause. The Fifth Amendment states:
"nor shall private property be taken for public use without just com-
pensation., 31 1 This clause rather obviously applies only if property
exists, a private party owns it, and the government "takes" it.
312
Demonstrating that these obvious conditions apply in the context of
the ACPA, however, presents a complex and novel set of legal issues.
The ensuing sections of this Article discuss the Takings Clause as it
relates to domain names and the ACPA. Subpart A argues that do-
main names are private property protected under the Takings Clause.
Subpart B argues that the ACPA effects an exercise of eminent do-
main over registrants' property rights in domain names.
A. The Takings Clause Applied to Domain Names
That the Takings Clause protects a cybersquatter's interest in a
domain name is a proposition that has received limited considera-
306. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 13 (1999) (commenting that the ACPA would prohibit the
conduct at issue in Panavision).
307. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
308. Id. § 1117 (statutory note) (stating that the ACPA "shall apply to all domain names
registered before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act").
309. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
310. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 13.
311. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
312. See id.
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tion.313 Proving the validity of this proposition requires examining
whether property rights even exist in a domain name, and if so,
whether the Takings Clause applies to that sort of property. 314 Ac-
cordingly, Subpart 1 examines the property nature of domain names,
and Subpart 2 applies the relevant Supreme Court case law to the sort
of property that a domain name most resembles. Based on these
analyses, this part concludes that the Takings Clause protects a cyber-
squatter's property interest in a domain name.
1. The Property Nature of Domain Names
Much debate has arisen over whether a domain name represents
property separate and distinct from the contractual rights of a registra-
tion agreement.31 5 On the one hand, domain names seem to be a crea-
ture of contract between a registrar and the registrant.316  Conse-
quently, the only property rights that a registrant has in a domain
name seem to be those that flow from the contractual rights to the reg-
istrar's services.317 Hence, domain names can be thought of as repre-
senting only a registrant's contractual rights to services of a regis-
trar.318 From this view, domain names would not represent a res over
which a registrant could assert a property interest.
319
On the other hand, domain names exhibit characteristics of prop-
erty that are distinct from the services that a registrar provides.32°
Property represents rights against all others to possess, use, and dis-
pose of a thing.32' Commentators have noted that in the case of an in-
313. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 502 n.17
(2nd Cir. 2000) (ruling that the ACPA was not unconstitutionally retroactive); Brian C. Smith,
Note, Private Property for Public Use: The Federal Trademark Dilution Act and Anticyber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act as Violations of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 11
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 191 (2003) (challenging the constitutionality of the ACPA on takings
grounds).
314. See Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-04 (1984) (analyzing
whether commercial data was property worthy of constitutional protection under the Takings
Clause).
315. E.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030-36 (9th Cir. 2003); Dorer v. Arel, 60
F. Supp. 2d 558, 560-61 (E.D. Va. 1999); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529
S.E.2d 80, 85-87 (Va. 2000).




320. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 (stating that domain names satisfy the definition of
property).
321. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
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corporeal thing, the right to possession consists of the right to exclude
others from using it.322  A domain-name registrant has these rights
over a domain name: the registrant can exclude others from using it
because of the restrictive nature of the Intemet medium;323 the regis-
trant can use the domain name by choosing to post a website at the
domain name;324 and finally, the registrant can dispose of the domain
name by selling, assigning, or relinquishing the domain name. 325
These rights do not attach to the services of the registrar, but rather to
the particular data arrangement that has the effect of functioning as a
virtual "space" on the Intemet. In short, with respect to the domain-
name space on the Internet, a registrant has rights to use, dispose of,
and exclude others from controlling it.326  Thus, in contrast to the
former view that domain names represent contractual rights to serv-
ices, another view exists that domain names represent the res over
which a registrant asserts property rights. As discussed below, the
latter view prevails.
a. The Argument That a Domain Name Represents a Service
Contract. Umbro
The leading authority for the proposition that a domain name
represents only the fruit of a service contract is a Virginia Supreme
Court decision, Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International,
NENT DOMAIN 58-59 (1985) ("[R]ights of ownership in a given thing consist in a set of rights
of infinite duration, good against the rest of the world: with three separate incidents: posses-
sion, use, and disposition."); accord United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78
(1945) ("The critical terms [of the Takings Clause] are 'property,' 'taken' and 'just compensa-
tion.' It is conceivable that the first was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physi-
cal thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the other
hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inher-
ing in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.
In point of fact, the construction given the phrase has been the latter.").
322. E.g., James L. Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56
WASH. L. REv. 583, 589 (1981). Judge Oakes also comments that property includes the right
to receive income from the use of the thing, and realize capital through the consumption,
waste, sale, or destruction of the thing. A domain-name registrant has the right to receive in-
come from the domain name by posting a website, or alternatively, renting the domain name to
a third party. See Burk, supra note 96, at 14 (stating that once a domain name is registered
the holder may "use it, reassign it, or simply hold it unused").
323. See discussion supra Part 1I.B; Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 ("[R]egistrants have a
legitimate claim to exclusivity.").
324. See discussion supra Part II.B.
325. Burk, supra note 96, at 14.
326. See id.
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Inc.327  There, a judgment creditor obtained a default judgment
against the judgment debtor for the domain name "umbro.com."
328
The judgment creditor then obtained a writ of fieri facias 329 and insti-
tuted garnishment proceedings, naming the registrar as the gar-
nishee. 330 The judgment creditor sought to garnish 38 domain names
that the judgment debtor had registered with the registrar, but the reg-
istrar responded that it held no gamishable property belonging to the
judgment debtor.331 The registrar characterized the domain names as
"standardized, executory service contracts." 332 The Supreme Court of
Virginia agreed with the registrar's characterization.333 Reasoning
that the rights to a domain name do not exist separate and apart from
the registrar's services, the court concluded that "'a domain name reg-
istration is the product of a contract for services between the registrar
and the registrant.'
334
By ruling that property rights to a domain name only represent
the registrant's rights to the registrar's services, the Umbro court
foreclosed the possibility that a domain name could represent a prop-
erty interest in a thing itself.335 As commentators have noted, its deci-
327. 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000); see also America Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp.
2d 848, 858 (E.D. Va. 2000) (defining a domain name to be "merely 'a reference point in a
computer database"') (quoting NSI's description of a domain name as stated by the court in
Umbra, 529 S.E.2d at 85).
328. Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 81.
329. A writ of fieri facias is "[a] writ of execution that directs a marshal or sheriff to
seize and sell a [person's] property [in order] to satisfy a money judgment." BLACK'S, supra
note 48, at 641.
330. Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 81.
331. Id. at81-82.
332. Id. at 81.
333. Id. at 86.
334. Id. (quoting Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999)). The Umbro
court purported to adopt the holding of Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561, in reaching its decision.
529 S.E.2d at 86. This purported adoption, however, is misleading. In Dorer, the court de-
clined to decide "the knotty issue of whether a domain name is personal property subject to the
lien of fieri facias." 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561. The Dorer court provided argument for deciding
the issue either way. Id. at 560-61. The court opined that one argument for holding that it was
not personal property was that the domain name is the product of a contract for services. Id. at
561. The court then stated that an argument for an opposite holding was that some domain
names "are valuable assets as domain names irrespective of any goodwill which might be at-
tached to them." Id. After identifying both arguments for and against deciding whether a do-
main name is personal property, the court declined to decide the issue. Id. at 562. Umbro's
reliance on Dorer is therefore misplaced. See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Ju-
dicial Dissonance: The Trouble with Domain Name Classification, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV.
183, 200-01 (2001).
335. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 86. The Umbro court attempted to leave open the pos-
sibility that a domain name could be intellectual property. See id. at 86 (stating that its holding
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sion appears incorrectly decided.336 The ruling implies that the value
of the property rights attached to a domain name correspond with the
registrar's services. 337 In other words, according to Umbro, when a
person purchases the property rights to a domain name from another
registrant, the person is paying value for the registrar's services. 338
The absurdity of this proposition is apparent when considering the
disparate market values for domain names. 339  For instance, "busi-
ness.com" sold for $7.5 million;340 "Xrt5t+adf34xxq23.com" sells for
less than two cents. 341 According to the Umbro court's ruling, the
did not require it to decide "whether the circuit court correctly characterized a domain name as
a 'form of intellectual property"'). Its ruling, however, precludes this possibility as the court
characterized a domain name as nothing more than a contractual right to services of the regis-
trar. Id.
336. The following commentators have recognized the incorrectness of the Umbra
holding: Beverly A. Bememan, Navigating the Bankruptcy Waters in a Domain Name Row-
boat, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 61, 74 (2003), at http://www.jmls.edu/ripll
vol3/issue l.htm ("The Supreme Court of Virginia's analysis of the legal concept of property
was flawed [in Umbro.]"); Marjorie Chertok & Warren E. Agin, Restart.com: Identifying, Se-
curing and Maximizing the Liquidation Value of Cyber-Assets in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 8
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 255, 273-74 (2000) (criticizing the Umbra decision); Francis G.
Conrad, Dot.Coms in Bankruptcy Valuations Under Title 11 or Www.Snipehunt in the
Dark.NoReorglNoAssets.com, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 417, 430-31 (2001) ("The prob-
lem with the Umbra rationale is that it fails to recognize the bundle of property rights that re-
side in a domain name."); David F. Fanning, Note, Quasi In Rem on the Cyberseas, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1887, 1899-1900 (2001) (arguing against the Umbro holding); Alexis Freeman,
LL.M. Thesis, Internet Domain Name Security Interests: Why Debtors Can Grant Them and
Lenders Can Take Them in This New Type of Hybrid Property, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
853, 877 (2002) (disagreeing with the Umbro conclusion); Nguyen, supra note 334, at 203
("The decisions in Umbra and Dorer fail to correctly classify domain names."); Smith, supra
note 313, at 206 ("The courts in Umbro and Dorer failed to correctly classify domain
names ... ").
337. See Umbra, 529 S.E.2d at 86.
338. See id
339. See Fanning, supra note 336, at 1895 ("The recent phenomena of selling domain
names for astronomical prices indicates the obvious, that domain names, at least some, do in-
deed represent value."); see also Caslon website at http://www.caslon.com.au/dnsprices-
note.htm (Sept. 2004) (stating that "business.com" sold for $7.5 million, "asseenontv.com"
sold for $5.1 million, "korea.com" sold for $5.0 million, "altavista.com" sold for $3.8 million,
"loans.com" sold for $3.0 million, "wines.com" sold for $3.0 million, "wine.com" sold for
$2.9 million, "autos.com" sold for $2.2 million, "express.com" sold for $2.0 million, "market-
ingtoday.com" sold for $1.5 million, "eflowers.com" sold for $1.0 million, "sky.com" sold for
$1.0 million, "whitehousecrisis.com" sold for $1.0 million, "websites.com" sold for $0.9 mil-
lion, "forsalebyowner.com" sold for $0.8 million, "drugs.com" sold for $0.8 million,
"lstbandwidth.com" sold for $0.8 million, and "jobs.com" sold for $0.8 million) (on file with
the Willamette Law Review).
340. Jon Swartz, Eminent Domain Name, Forbes.com, 5 (Feb. 7, 2000), at http://
www.Forbes.com/2000/02/07/feat.html (on file with the Willamette Law Review); Greg John-
son, The Costly Game for Net Names, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at A 1.
341. To determine the market value for "Xrt5t+adf34xxq23.com," this author registered
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registrar for "business.com" provides services worth $7.5 million
whereas the registrar for "Xrt5t+adf34xxq23.com" provides services
worth less than two cents. In truth, however, both registrars provide
the exact same service;342 indeed, the original registrars for both do-
main names were actually the same entity.343 This disparity in value,
coupled with the fact that both registrants receive the exact same serv-
ices from the same registrar, implies that when a registrant sells a
domain name, the registrant sells more than just the rights to the reg-
istrar's services. The Umbro court's decision thus conflicts with the
fact that when a registrant sells the rights of use to a domain name,
the registrant transfers property rights that are distinct from the regis-
trar's services. 34
the domain name and then attempted to sell it on an Internet auction website, Ebay.com. The
attempt to sell it for at least two cents was unsuccessful.
342. See discussion supra Part II.B.
343. The registrar for "business.com" and "Xrt5t+adf34xxq23.com" was Network Solu-
tions, Inc.
344. Obviously, the value of the "business.com" domain name lies not in the services
that a registrar provides, but rather in the goodwill existing in the domain name independent of
those services. See Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[I]f the only
value that comes from transfer of the domain name is from the value added by the user, it is
inappropriate to consider that an element subject to execution. Some domain names, however,
are valuable assets as domain names irrespective of any goodwill which might be attached to
them."). This valuable goodwill seems to arise because goodwill exists in the minds of the
public with respect to the combination of alphanumeric characters employed as a domain
name, e.g., "business." In contrast, the public associates no goodwill with other domain
names, such as "Xrt5t+adf34xxq23." The disparate prices in the domain-name market reflect
this difference in the public goodwill associated with each domain name. Thus, the value of a
domain name qua domain name exists because of the public goodwill associated with the word
used as a domain name.
In the context of cybersquatting, this principle implies that the value of a domain name
containing a trademark arises from the public goodwill attached to the word within the domain
name-the trademark itself. The domain name "nike.com" is valuable because the public at-
taches goodwill to the trademarked word, Nike. Nevertheless, this fact does not imply that a
mark holder has any property right to the domain name. HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp.
2d 500, 508 (D. Md. 1999) ("Nothing in trademark law requires that title to domain names that
incorporate trademarks or portions of trademarks be provided to trademark holders."). The
fact that a trademark imbues a res with value does not automatically provide the mark holder
with property rights to that res. See id. The owner of the res must commercially use the
trademark before the mark holder has any right to enjoin the specific use of the res. See id. at
506-07. Yet the domain-name context presents a unique situation where a person is able to
profit from the goodwill of a trademark without making any commercial use of the mark. Be-
cause the property rights of a trademark are not property rights in gross, see 4 MCCARTHY,
supra note 11, § 24:11, trademark law is unable to fully realize its policy goal of preventing
third-party registrants from profiting from the goodwill associated with the mark.
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b. The Argument That a Domain Name Represents a Virtual Res
(i) The Real-Property Analogy Under Kremen
Unlike in Umbro, in Kremen v. Cohen the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that domain names inhere property rights separate and distinct
from a registrant's contractual rights for service with a registrar.3 45
There, the court considered whether a domain name could be the sub-
ject of the tort of conversion.346 A third party had sent a forged letter
to the registrar of "sex.com" claiming to be the rightful registrant of
the domain name and further claiming that the rightful registrant had
relinquished his rights to it. 347 Based on the forged letter, the registrar
forfeited the rightful registrant's control of "sex.com," and the third
party then registered the domain name.348 After unsuccessfully at-
tempting to collect on a judgment against the third party, the rightful
registrant sued the registrar for conversion of the domain name.349
The rightful registrant argued that the registrar acted as a bailee of the
domain name, and converted it by giving it away to the third party.350
On a summary judgment motion by the registrar, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that it was legally possible to assert a tort claim for conver-
sion of a domain name. 35' The court reasoned:
Like a share of corporate stock or a plot of land, a domain name is
a well-defined interest. Someone who registers a domain name
decides where on the Internet those who invoke that particular
name-whether by typing it into their web browsers, by following
a hyperlink, or by other means-are sent. Ownership is exclusive
in that the registrant alone makes that decision. Moreover, like
other forms of property, domain names are valued, bought and
sold, often for millions of dollars, and they are now subject to in
rem jurisdiction.
352
Thus, the court appeared to view domain names as representing a vir-
tual "place" where Internet consumers can be sent to.353 Ownership
345. 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
346. Id. at 1029-36.
347. Id. at 1026-1027.
348. Id. at 1027.
349. Id. at 1027-28.
350. Id. at 1028.
351. Id. at 1030.
352. Id. (internal citations omitted).
353. See id ("Someone who registers a domain name decides where on the Internet
those who invoke that particular name.., are sent.").
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of this "place" is exclusive, according to the court, because the regis-
trant alone decides where that place is by virtue of the fact that the
registrant defines the data arrangement that instantiates the place's
very existence.
354
The Ninth Circuit's comparison to real property is instructive.355
The court further stated: "[r]egistering a domain name is like staking
a claim to a plot of land at the title office. It informs others that the
domain name is the registrant's and no one else's." 356 According to
this analogy, then, a domain name is like a plot of land. This meta-
phor suggests that a domain name is not merely a label for property
like a street address is, but rather it is the property itself.357 Carrying
the analogy further would imply that (1) the registration agreement is
like a deed; (2) the webpage is like a structure that a landowner builds
on the plot of land; (3) the registrar is like the administrative persons
(lawyer, real-estate agent, title recorder) involved in a land-sale trans-
action; and (4) the government is like a real-estate seller. Each com-
parison is discussed in turn.
First, the registration agreement is similar to a deed in that like a
deed, the registration agreement is an instrument representing rights
to a space, which instrument thereby denotes ownership of a res.
358
Just as a deed is effective upon delivery, 359 a registration agreement is
effective as soon as the registrant fills out and receives a virtual
copy. 360 "Delivery" of a domain name occurs when a registrant fills
out the necessary information in the agreement and accepts the terms
of use.36'
354. See id. ("Ownership is exclusive in that the registrant alone makes that decision.").
355. See Smith, supra note 313, at 203 (noting the similarities between a domain name
and real property); see also Berneman, supra note 336, at 67 ("[W]hile a domain name has
attributes of a street address and real property, it also has some distinguishing characteristics.
Those distinguishing characteristics enhance the domain name's characterization as property
rather than diminish it.").
356. Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030.
357. See id.
358. BLACK'S, supra note 48, at 423 ("A written instrument by which land is con-
veyed.").
359. In re Cook County Treasurer, 706 N.E.2d 465, 468 (Ill. 1998) ("The deed is effec-
tive upon delivery.").
360. A "virtual copy" refers to the electronic format of the registration agreement that a
registrant views on a registrar's website. After filling out an electronic version of a registra-
tion agreement, and then clicking on an icon representing an acceptance of the terms, an Inter-
net user receives a valid registration agreement, which agreement appears on the screen. At
that point, the Internet user has title to the domain name.
361. See discussion supra note 360.
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Second, the webpage is much like an edifice that a landowner
constructs on a plot of land. Just as a plot of land is necessary to
build an edifice, a domain name is necessary to display a webpage at
a website. The domain name is the foundation without which the
webpage structure could not exist in the ontology of the Internet.
Third, the domain name registrar functions similar to the admin-
istrative people in a land-sale transaction who draw up a deed and re-
cord ownership of the real property. In the context of real property,
these administrative people are necessary for a land claimant to assert
property rights against any third party.362 Similarly, a registrar facili-
tates a registrant's claim to a domain name by drawing up a registra-
tion agreement, and recording it in a forum that provides all other po-
tential registrants notice that the registrant claims rights of use over
the domain name. 363  Like a real-estate lawyer and title recorder, the
registrar provides services necessary for a property claimant to realize
good title to a res against all others.3 64 And like a real-estate lawyer
and title recorder, the registrar charges a fee that reflects the value of
its administration services, yet it does not reflect the value of the un-
365derlying res.
Related to the third point of comparison is the fourth: the Gov-
ernment is similar to a real-estate seller. An unclaimed domain name
is a resource that exists in the public commons. When a registrant
362. See Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 76 P.3d 711, 714 (Utah Ct.
App. 2003) ("'[I]f the grantee fails to record, he assumes the risk of a subsequent grantee of
the same land acquiring superior rights to his by recordation."') (quoting Horman v. Clark, 744
P.2d 1014, 1016 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); In re Cook County, 706 N.E.2d at 468 ("The grantee's
failure to record the deed may affect the grantee's rights vis-a-vis a third party . .
363. See discussion supra Part II.B.
364. See discussion supra Part II.B. A precise analogy between the domain-name and
real-property contexts should account for the fact that a registrant must renew the registration
agreement in order to maintain property rights to a domain name. In the real-property context,
a similar situation occurs when a tenant must renew a lease in order to maintain property rights
to a leasehold estate. The registrar, however, is not analogous to a landlord in that situation,
for unlike a landlord, the registrar holds no interest in a domain name. See ICANN, Registrar
Accreditation Agreement, § 3 (Registrar Obligations), at http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-
agreement- 17may01 .htm (May 17, 2001). The analogous landlord in the domain name context
must be the owner of the common good from which a registrant instantiates a domain name.
That owner is the government-the entity that owns the collective public resources. The regis-
trar, then, functions as a gatekeeper for the Government's assignment of public resources to
private parties. A condition that the Government (through its gatekeeper) imposes on regis-
trants for maintaining private control over the former public resources is to renew the registra-
tion agreement. The property rights continue indefinitely as long as the registrant abides by
the terms and conditions of the renewable "lease."
365. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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claims it, the domain name is severed from the public commons.
366
Accordingly, a registrant takes title of a domain name from the owner
of the public commons-the Government. 367 The process is like the
land grab of 1862, where the Government allowed any person to take
title to land simply by being the first person to occupy the land and
paying a nominal fee.368 Unlike that land grab, however, the domain-
name registration process does not require that the registrant give any
consideration to the government for taking possession of the public
good. The only required fee is that which pays for the administrative
services necessary to assert the claim of right.369 By government au-
thorization, those administrative services are offered through a private
entity, ICANN, which delegates the administration process to indi-
vidual registrars.370 In authorizing ICANN to perform those services,
the government did not turn over its property rights to unclaimed do-
main names in the public commons. 371 As a public good, unregistered
domain names appear to be owned by the government. Registrants
gain property rights to the domain names from the government-not
from a registrar.372
366. According to John Locke, property rights vest when a person mixes his labor with
a thing in a way "that excludes the common right of other Men." JOHN LOCKE, Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967)
(1690). See also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405.
367. See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 327-38 (1890) (treating the "open unenclosed
country," on which persons grazed their animals, as a public common belonging to the gov-
ernment).
368. Under the Homestead Act of 1862, the public could acquire 160 acres of unoccu-
pied land from the government by paying a nominal fee after five years of residence. Home-
stead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (repealed 1976). The Act also provided that a
person could acquire less than 160 acres of land by paying the government $1.25 per acre or
less. Id. Through that Act, a person could take lawful possession of valuable property-
without having done anything to instantiate the value-by paying only a nominal fee to the
government. Id.
Courts have compared the process of a registrant acquiring property rights to valuable
domain names-without having done anything to instantiate that value-to the same sort of
"land grab." See Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 808 (describing
cybersquatting as "'the Internet version of a land grab') (quoting Virtual Works, Inc. v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc. 238 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001)); Interstellar Starship Serv. Ltd. v.
Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Women to Women, Inc. v. Woman to
Woman Co., No. 02-52-P-H, 2003 WL 1741110, at *5 n.4 (D. Me. Apr. 1, 2003) (same).
369. See discussion supra Part II.B.
370. See discussion supra Part II.B.
371. See discussion supra Part II.B. If the government had given ICANN property
rights to all unregistered domain names, ICANN would likely sell the domain names for their
market value. Instead, ICANN, through the registrars, only requires a fee commensurate with
the value of the administrative services it provides.
372. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984-85 (9th
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The Kremen real-property analogy thus appears to fit the do-
main-name context rather well. Yet regardless of whether a domain
name is exactly analogous to a plot of land, the important point of the
Kremen holding is that a domain name represents a registrant's rights
to control a specific data arrangement representing a virtual place on
the Internet.373 By implication, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that
domain names do not merely represent a registrant's rights to a regis-
trar's services. 374  The Kremen decision recognizes that a domain
name represents a res over which a registrant has property rights.375
Cir. 1999) ("[A registrar] does not supply the domain-name combination any more than the
Postal Service supplies a street address by performing the routine service of routing mail.").
373. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030-32 (9th Cir. 2003). Some "places" on
the Internet (data arrangements composing domain names) are worth more than others because
of public goodwill that exists in the domain name, independent of any website. See discussion
supra note 344. The analogous situation to cybersquatting in the real-property context would
therefore occur if a person claimed land knowing that someone else had buried gold just be-
neath the surface. Mark holders put the "gold" in certain domain names, fail to claim the
property, and then cybersquatters come along and extract that value even though they have
done nothing to deserve it. Cybersquatting is thus like claiming land that has accrued its value
only because of another person's labor. Unfortunately for the other person-the mark
holder-by leaving the "gold" unclaimed under the surface, that person has lost his or her right
to the gold. See Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., 33 Ch. D. 562, 568 (1886) (Chitty, J.) ("Being enti-
tled to the inheritance and in lawful possession, [the plaintiff] was in possession of the ground,
not merely of the surface, but of everything that lay beneath the surface down to the centre of
the earth, and consequently in possession of the [property discovered under the surface].").
374. Construing a registrant's property rights in a domain name as separate from the
registrant's rights to the registrar's services is consistent with judicial interpretation of a per-
son's right to own a specific telephone number and that person's right to receive telephone
services. See Ga. Power Co. v. Sec. Inv. Props., Inc., 559 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1977)
("[T]elephone numbers constitute a unique property interest, the value of which increases as
the number becomes widely known .... The property interest in such numbers differs from a
subscriber's rights to the telephone utility's service."); Darman v. Metro. Alarm Corp., 528
F.2d 908, 910 (1st Cir. 1976) (recognizing that the value of telephone numbers allows their
conveyance to increase the value of a bankrupt's estate).
375. It should be noted that Kremen does not stand alone in treating domain names as
representing property distinct from the registrant's right to registrar services. In Network Solu-
tions, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., the plaintiff, a registrar, sought a statutory interpleader to
"assign registration and use" of a domain name "as determined by the [c]ourt." 946 F. Supp.
858, 860 (D. Colo. 1996). The statutory interpleader requires that a plaintiff have possession
of money or property in which two other parties assert conflicting interests over that money or
property. Id. Contractual rights to services, as described in Umbro, would not qualify as
property under the rules of statutory interpleader. See 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1704, at 540 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that an
interpleader is appropriate only where the dispute is over a "limited fund or property"). In
Clue Computing, the federal district court opined that "under some circumstances a determina-
tion of rights to intangibles, such as domain names, could be decided in an interpleader ac-
tion." 946 F. Supp. at 860. The court stated that those circumstances would consist of the reg-
istrar suspending the registrant's use of the domain name, and the registrar showing that it had
no financial interest in the outcome of the competing claims for the domain name. Id. at 860-
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(ii) The ACPA's In Rem Provision
Further support for the proposition that a domain name repre-
sents property rights in a virtual thing arises from the ACPA itself.
3 76
The ACPA provides for in rem jurisdiction over a domain name.377
Pennoyer v. Neff establishes that in rem jurisdiction is only proper
where a plaintiff asserts property rights over a res.378 Literally trans-
lated from Latin, "in rem" means "against the thing. 379 Property
rights to a service contract do not attach to any res. By providing for
in rem jurisdiction over a domain name, then, the ACPA implicitly
recognizes that the domain name represents property rights to a res.38°
That res appears to be the data arrangement denoting a virtual "space"
on the Internet.
61. The court's statement that domain names are subject to actions for statutory interpleader
thus implies that property rights exist in a domain name as a representation of an Internet data
arrangement, rather than as a representation of a registrar's services.
Similarly, in Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National, Inc., the Ninth Circuit ruled
that a federal district court had specific jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action con-
cerning ownership rights to "masters.com." 223 F.3d 1082, 1086-89 (9th Cir. 2000). In a
concurring opinion, two of the judges composing the three-judge panel wrote that the defen-
dant's actions illustrated an intent to convert the "masters.com" domain name. Id. at 1089
(Sneed, J., concurring).
376. Bememan, supra note 336, at 79 ("Congress apparently considered a domain name
to be a res of some kind, otherwise Congress would not have included in rem jurisdiction in
the ACPA."); Freeman, supra note 336, at 877 ("By providing for in rem jurisdiction and the
resulting ability to attach and seize a domain name, the ACPA is instructive in concluding that
a domain name is property that can be attached."); Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cy-
berspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 124-26 (2000); Nguyen, supra note 334, at 208-10 ("[T]he
inclusion of in rem jurisdiction provides courts with the ammunition to declare that domain
names are property as prescribed by the ACPA."); Smith, supra note 313, at 208 ("Perhaps the
most compelling argument that at least some domain names are property for purposes of Fifth
Amendment takings stems from the in rem jurisdictional provision of the ACPA.").
377. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000).
378. 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
379. BLACK'S, supra note 48, at 797.
380. BADGLEY, supra note 11, § 1.04 ("In the context of the federal [ACPA] ... it has
been held that a domain name is a form of 'property,' since the ACPA expressly allows in rem
lawsuits, that is, lawsuits against the domain name itself rather than against the domain name
owner.").
The ACPA's legislative history regarding in rem jurisdiction supports the interpretation
that a domain name is property representing data that denote a virtual space on the Internet. It
defines a domain name as an "alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned
by any domain name registrar.. . as part of an electronic address on the Internet," and then
states that in rem jurisdiction enables "a mark owner to seek the forfeiture, cancellation, or
transfer of an infringing domain name by filing an in rem action against the name itself." S.
REP. No. 106-140, at 10 (1999). Thus, according to the legislative history, a domain name is
property in the form of an arrangement of data-an alphanumeric designation of an Internet
website.
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Federal courts have faced constitutional challenges to the
ACPA's in rem provision on due process grounds; cybersquatters
have argued that a domain name is not a proper kind of "thing" to
serve as a res.381 In Caesars World v. Caesars-Palace. Corn, et al., the
district court responded to the challenge with a simple yet telling
statement: "[e]ven if a domain name is no more than data, Congress
can make data property and assign its place of registration as its si-
tus.,'382 Other federal district courts have adopted this position, quot-
ing this passage from Caesars World.38 3 Furthermore, in Porsche
Cars North America v. Porsche.net, et al., the Fourth Circuit rejected
an argument that domain names were not property subject to in rem
jurisdiction.38 4 Citing Caesars World, the court observed that "Con-
gress may treat a domain name.., as property subject to in rem juris-
diction if it chooses, without violating the Constitution.,
385
Thus, commentators, most courts, and Congress all appear to
recognize that a domain name represents a legally cognizable res over
which a registrant holds property rights. The recognition is a reflec-
tion of the property-like characteristics that a domain name exhibits in
the Internet medium.386 Interests in a domain name are well de-
fined;387 those interests are valued for a domain name's ability to con-
trol a specific data arrangement on the Internet (or in other words, its
ability to occupy a specific space for constructing a website);388 the
rights to use that data arrangement are exclusive, transferable, and
subject to in rem jurisdiction. 389 So while a service contract is neces-
381. See, e.g., Cable News Network, L.P. v. Cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 490-92
(E.D. Va. 2001) aff'd in relevant part per curiam No. 02-1112, 2003 WL 152846, at *2-3 (4th
Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) (unpublished opinion); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.Com,, 112 F.
Supp. 2d 502, 503-05 (E.D. Va. 2000); Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. technodome.com, No. CA-
00-00714-A, 2000 WL 33666935, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2000).
382. Caesars World, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 504.
383. See Cable News, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 492; Heathmount, 2000 WL 33666935, at *1;
see also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(quoting the same passage but not in answer to a constitutional challenge).
Courts have further noted that "[t]here is no prohibition on a legislative body making
something property." Caesars World, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 504; Lucent Techs., 95 F. Supp. 2d at
535; Heathmount, 2000 WL 33666935, at *1.
384. 302 F.3d 248, 259-60 (4th Cir. 2002).
385. Id. at 260; accord Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214,
228-29 (4th Cir. 2002).
386. See EPSTEIN, supra note 321, at 59; see discussion supra Part V.A. 1.
387. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
388. See discussion supra Part V.A.l.a.
389. See Burk, supra note 96, at T 14; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000).
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sary for a registrant to assert property rights against all others-just as
a deed is-the domain name itself appears to be a res-much like a
plot of land-separate and distinct from the registrar's services.390
2. Supreme Court Recognition of Property Rights in Data
Arrangements
The above discussion has concluded that a registrant has a prop-
erty interest in the arrangement of data that represents a virtual
"space" on the Internet-a domain name. 391 The ensuing subsection
discusses whether the Takings Clause applies to this form of intangi-
ble property.
The Supreme Court has held that an arrangement of data can be
classified as property for purposes of applying the Takings Clause.
392
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court considered whether a
trade secret constituted property.393 There, the federal government
enacted legislation requiring sellers of pesticides to submit test data
supporting claims on the pesticide labels, including the formula for
the pesticide. 394 The plaintiff, the Monsanto Company, spent in ex-
cess of $23.6 million developing health, safety, and environmental
data regarding a pesticide. 395  Monsanto challenged the data-dis-
closure legislation as effecting an unconstitutional taking.
396
In considering this challenge, the Supreme Court was for the first
time faced with the question of whether commercial data could con-
stitute property subject to the protection of the Takings Clause.3 97 To
determine the answer, the Court relied on the principle that property
rights "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source [of the Con-
stitution] such as state law."398 The Court then pointed out that the
390. Nguyen, supra note 334, at 205 (arguing that domain names should not be classi-
fied as rights to a service contract, but rather "as property, or more precisely, intangible prop-
erty").
391. See discussion supra Part V.A.1.
392. Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
393. Id. at 1000-01.
394. Id. at 991.
395. Id. at 998.
396. Id. at 998-99.
397. Id. at 1001 ("This Court never has squarely addressed the applicability of the pro-
tections of the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment to commercial data of the kind involved
in this case.").
398. Id. (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161
(1980)).
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Restatement of Torts recognized trade secrets as property, as did the
legislative history of the disputed federal legislation.399 The Court fi-
nally noted the property-like characteristics of trade secrets: they are
assignable; they can form the res of a trust; and they pass to a trustee
in bankruptcy. 400 Given this support for the legally cognizable prop-
erty nature of trade secrets, the Court declared that a trade secret "is
consonant with a notion of 'property' that extends beyond the land
and tangible goods and includes the products of an individual's 'la-
bour and invention.' 40 1 The Court further observed "[t]hat intangible
property rights protected by state law are deserving of the protection
of the Taking Clause .... ,,402 The Court held that intangible forms of
property should be included in the Court's past definition of property
that is protected under the Takings Clause-specifically, "'the group
of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the
right to possess, use and dispose of it.'4 0 3 This statement implies that
intangible property rights in data merit the same constitutional degree
of protection as physical property.4°
The Monsanto holding strongly suggests that domain names
should receive as much constitutional protection as physical prop-
erty.4 °5 The circumstances that the Court observed in Monsanto that
were sufficient to find property protectable under the Takings Clause
are present in the domain-name context. Both state and federal law
recognize the property nature of domain names-i.e., rights to a vir-
tual space on the Internet: domain names are subject to the tort of
conversion, 406 and the ACPA provides in rem jurisdiction over
them.40 7 Also, domain names-as a representation of a virtual space
on the Internet-exhibit traditional characteristics of property:40 8 their
399. Id. at 1002.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 1002-03 (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405).
402. Id. at 1003.
403. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
377-78 (1945)).
404. See id
405. See id. at 1003-04.
406. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Kremen's domain
name is protected by California conversion law . .
407. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2) (2000).
408. "Traditional characteristics of property" means that ownership of the thing in-
cludes the rights of possession, use, and disposition. See EPSTEIN, supra note 321, at 58-59.
See also Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 (opining that domain names exhibit characteristics of prop-
erty).
[41:1
2005] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING ACT 61
409 410 411owners have rights of possession, use, and disposition.
The most compelling reason that Monsanto implies that domain
names are protected under the Takings Clause is that a domain name
is the same sort of res as in Monsanto. The property rights recognized
in Monsanto consisted of Monsanto's interests in data, or more pre-
cisely, its interests in the arrangement of the data.412 The pesticide in-
formation itself was not the property at issue, for data are facts, and
facts cannot be owned.413 Arrangements of facts, however, do give
rise to property interests.414 Furthermore, a holder of a trade secret
only has property interests in the arrangement of data inasmuch as the
holder is able to restrict the presentation of data to a limited number
of persons.415 The ability to use and control an arrangement of data in
the trade-secret context is only possible where the medium of presen-
tation consists of a defined, limited group of people.416 The property
in Monsanto, then, consisted of the rights to an arrangement of data,
and those rights were contingent upon a specific medium of presenta-
tion.417
The property at issue in the domain-name context consists of the
right to an arrangement of data.418 The ability to use and control the
arrangement of data representing a domain name is only possible
where the medium of presentation consists of a common computer
communications system, otherwise known as the Internet.419  The
only difference between the rights to the arrangement of data in the
trade-secret context and the rights to the arrangement of data in the
domain-name context is the different media of presentation necessary
to realize control over the data arrangements. Whereas property
rights in a trade secret require a medium of presentation comprising a
409. Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 ("[R]egistrants have a legitimate claim to exclusivity.").
410. See discussion supra Part II.B.
411. See Burk, supra note 96, at 14.
412. See467 U.S. 986, 1000-01 (1984).
413. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991)
("That there can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood.").
414. Id. at 345 ("[I]t is beyond dispute that compilations of facts are within the subject
matter of copyright.") (emphasis added).
415. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1002 ("[Tlhe extent of the property right therein is defined
by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interests from disclosure to oth-
ers.").
416. Id.
417. See id. at 1001-02.
418. See discussion supra Part II.B.
419. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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limited number of persons, property rights in a domain name require
the medium of presentation comprising a vast computer network.
This distinction, however, is immaterial because the medium of pres-
entation was not relevant to the Monsanto Court's holding that a trade
secret was property subject to the protection of the Takings Clause.420
Monsanto's holding implies that rights to an arrangement of data fall
within the scope of protected property under the Takings Clause,
therefore, it follows that the Takings Clause protects domain
names.
421
B. A Governmental Taking of Domain Names Under the ACPA
This Section argues that the government exercises eminent do-
main through the ACPA. After the Supreme Court determined in
Monsanto that data arrangements can be property, it opined that a
three-factor balancing test should guide the Court's inquiry into
whether the government has "taken" the claimant's property interests
in the data arrangement. 422 As originally set forth in Penn Central
Transportation v. City of New York, the three-factor balancing test
consists of examining: (1) the character of the governmental action;
(2) its economic impact; and (3) the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations. 423 The ensu-
ing three subsections apply each factor to the government action un-
der the ACPA.
1. The Character of the Governmental Action
The inquiry into the character of the governmental action ad-
dresses whether the government interference with property is either a
"physical invasion," or alternatively, a government regulation.424 The
Court has described a "physical invasion" through the following
metaphor: "[T]he government does not simply take a single 'strand'
420. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001-04.
421. The fact that property rights of a domain name are conditioned upon renewing the
registration agreement does not affect this conclusion. As discussed above, a domain name is
similar to a leasehold estate with respect to this renewal characteristic. See discussion supra
note 364. Leasehold estates are subject to constitutional protection against governmental tak-
ings. See, e.g., United States v. Adver. Checking Bureau, Inc., 204 F.2d 770, 772 (7th Cir.
1953) ("The correct measure of damages to a tenant on the taking of his leasehold interest by
condemnation is the market value of the use and occupancy of the leasehold .... ). There-
fore, domain names should also be protected.
422. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005.
423. Id.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
424. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
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from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle, tak-
ing a slice of every strand., 425 A regulation, on the other hand, con-
stitutes governmental action that decreases property value, but the
purpose of the action is incidental to that decrease.426  Whereas a
regulation affects only limited rights of use, a physical invasion (or in
other words, a physical appropriation) denies an owner all possible
rights of use.427 When the character of the governmental action is a
regulation, the Court proceeds to consider the second and third factors
in the Penn Central analysis.428 Conversely, when the action is a
permanent 429 physical appropriation of property, the Supreme Court
has always found a taking.430 The fact that a permanent physical ap-
propriation might achieve an important public benefit, that it has only
minimal economic impact on the property owner, or that it effects
only a minute intrusion in relation to the size of the whole piece of
property, does not change the categorization of the governmental ac-
tion; it is always a taking.43' This first factor can therefore be disposi-
tive in favor of the property owner.
At first glance, it seems that the ACPA does not effect a perma-
nent physical appropriation for the following two reasons: first, the
ACPA does not affect anything physical; and second, the ACPA
seems to prohibit only a narrow use of a domain name, i.e., possess-
ing it while having a bad-faith intent to profit from a mark. These
two reasons, however, are illusory. With respect to the first stated
reason, the Monsanto Court held that intangible property is subject to
the same Takings Clause protections afforded physical property.432
So although the data arrangement is not a physical item, the Constitu-
tion's protection against uncompensated "physical" appropriations
425. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (citing
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
426. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922).
427. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
428. See id. at 426.
429. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (holding that a
temporary physical invasion does not constitute a taking)
430. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Loretto, 458 U.S. at
434-35.
431. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 ("In general, (at least with regard to permanent physical
invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose
behind it, we have required compensation."); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35 (stating that a per-
manent physical invasion results in a taking "without regard to whether the action achieves an
important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner").
432. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984).
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should apply in the context of data arrangements.433 According to
Monsanto, the protection against the government controlling all of a
claimant's interest in a res applies not only to physical property, but
to intangible property as well.434 Monsanto thus implies that a regis-
trant's interest in the intangible domain-name property receives the
same constitutional protection against government appropriation of
the res as a person's interest in physical property does. 435 The first
stated reason-that the ACPA does not affect any "physical" prop-
erty--does not foreclose the possibility that the ACPA effects a
physical appropriation.
The second stated reason for not finding a permanent physical
appropriation also fails. The apparent single use of a domain name
that the ACPA prohibits-a bad-faith intent to profit from the good-
will of a mark--does not appear to be a "use" that can be lawfully
regulated.436 The following subsections argue that (1) this use is itself
an unconstitutional basis for regulating property rights, such that the
ACPA unlawfully transfers the property; and (2) even if the use were
a constitutional basis for regulation, the use constitutes a fundamental
right of property, such that the ACPA transfers property for the sole
reason that the registrant is owning property. Simply stated, the ensu-
ing subsections conclude that the ACPA does not condition its rem-
edy of domain-name transfer on any legally regulable use; the prohib-
ited "use" of cybersquatting is a facade for a naked transfer of
property.
a. The Unconstitutionality of Regulating Property Based on Intent
As stated in Part IV, the ACPA strips a registrant of property
based solely on the registrant's intent: liability exists for possession of
a domain name with a bad-faith intent.437 Hence, the statute does not
regulate a "use" of the property, but rather a state of mind; in other
words, the government regulates the registrant's thoughts. The Su-
preme Court has stated: "The government 'cannot constitutionally
premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts.' First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the
government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that im-
433. See id.; see also discussion supra Part V.A.2.
434. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
435. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
436. See discussion infra Parts V.B.1.a-b.
437. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1.
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permissible end., 438  Simply put, the ACPA regulates domain-name
property solely on a registrant's state of mind, and so its property
regulation is unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. The en-
suing discussion explicates the nature of the First Amendment viola-
tion.
The registrant's intent can be regulated only if the registrant
somehow expresses it. That is, a person's thoughts are inherently pri-
vate, and absent some form of outward expression, a court is unable
to know those thoughts. Imposing liability for intent therefore neces-
sitates that a court infer the intent from some form of expressed
thought. Be it an action or a statement, some outward expression of
thought must be manifest for a court to judge whether a registrant
possesses the requisite bad-faith intent. The statute implicitly recog-
nizes this fact as it lists possible actions from which a court may infer
bad-faith intent.439 Specifically, bad-faith intent may be inferred from
the following actions: (1) offering to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign
the domain name to the mark holder or any third party for financial
gain;440 (2) providing false contact information when applying for
registration of a domain name; 44 (3) possessing multiple domain
names which are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others,
which at the time of acquisition, were distinctive or famous;442 and (4)
possessing a domain name containing a mark that is distinctive and
famous.443 Furthermore, the ACPA allows for additional acts to serve
438. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (quoting Stanley v.
Georgia., 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969)).
439. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
440. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI).
441. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII).
442. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII).
443. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX). The first four "bad-faith factors" listed in § 1125(d)(1)
(B)(i) suggest circumstances that tend to indicate an absence of a bad-faith intent; the last five
factors suggest circumstances tending to indicate the presence of a bad-faith intent. S. REP.
NO. 106-140 at 13 (1999); H.R. REP. No. 106-412 at 10 (1999). Of the last five factors, how-
ever, only four denote actions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(I)(B)(i)(V)-(IX) (2000). Factor V
denotes a mental state of mind: a person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's
online location. Id. at § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V). That factor thus allows a court to infer a state of
mind (bad-faith intent) from another state of mind (an intent to divert consumers from a mark
owner's website). See id It does not specify, however, the method whereby a court is to as-
certain the original state of mind-i.e., a person's intent to divert consumers. It seems evident
that posting a website at a domain name that contains the disputed mark would evince this in-
tent, but case law has held otherwise. Compare TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 440 (5th
Cir. 2004) (finding that no evidence existed that defendant intended to divert customers from
mark holder's site even though defendant's domain name contained the trademark without any
spelling differentiation), with Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482-84 (3rd Cir. 2001) (find-
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as a basis for inferring bad faith, namely, any act that a court discre-
tionarily determines to be a communication of this intent.444  The
ACPA therefore strips registrants of property by inferring their mental
thoughts from their conduct. It effectively punishes a property owner
for the communicative impact of his or her conduct, where the subject
of communication is an intent to profit from a mark.
The First Amendment protects thoughts that are expressed
through conduct. 44 5  Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning First
Amendment protection of conduct that expresses thought examines
(1) whether the conduct is sufficiently expressive to merit a First
Amendment analysis;446 and (2) whether the government restriction is
justified based on the government's interest in the nonspeech element
of the conduct.44 7 If the conduct is sufficiently expressive, and if the
governmental interest in the regulated conduct is not justified, then
the prohibited expression is viewed as speech, and protected insofar
as the content is not constitutionally proscribable.448 Thus, a First
Amendment analysis of the ACPA's regulation of expressed
thought-bad-faith intent-should first examine whether the conduct
at issue is sufficiently expressive to merit a First Amendment analy-
sis.4 4 9 If it is, the analysis should next examine whether the govern-
ment restriction is permissible based on a justifiable interest in regu-
lating a nonspeech element of the conduct at issue. 45° If the
restriction is impermissible, the analysis should finally proceed to ex-
amine whether the expressed thought is to any extent proscribable. 451
ing that defendant intended to divert customers from mark holder's website because defen-
dant's domain name was one letter different from the mark at issue).
444. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) ("In determining whether a person has a bad faith
intent described under subparagraph (a), a court may consider factors such as, but not limited
to .. ") (emphasis added); see, e.g., Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202
F.3d 489, 499 (2nd Cir. 2000) ("The most important grounds for our holding that [the defen-
dant] acted with a bad faith intent... are the unique circumstances of this case, which do not
fit neatly into the specific factors enumerated by Congress but may nevertheless be considered
under the statute.").
445. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("The First Amendment
generally prevents government from proscribing.., expressive conduct because of disap-
proval of the ideas expressed.").
446. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,404 (1989).
447. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
448. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382-83 ("Content-based regulations are presumptively in-
valid. From 1791 to the present, however, our society ... has permitted restrictions upon the
content of speech in a few limited areas ... .
449. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.
450. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
451. SeeR.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-84.
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This analysis follows.
(i) Conduct Sufficiently Expressive to Merit a First Amendment
Analysis
The Supreme Court has set forth two conditions for deciding
whether the communicative impact of conduct is sufficient to require
a First Amendment analysis.452 In Texas v. Johnson, the Court stated
that this issue turns on "whether an intent to convey a particularized
message [is] present, and whether the likelihood [is] great that the
message [will] be understood by those who view[] it.",453 Under this
standard, the conduct at issue in the ACPA-that which gives rise to
an inference of intent to profit from a trademark-appears to merit a
First Amendment analysis. Through the conduct listed in the ACPA,
the cybersquatter intends to convey a particularized message, and the
likelihood is great that those who view the message will understand it.
With respect to Factor VI of the ACPA's laundry list of "bad-faith-
intent" conduct, a registrant ostensibly intends to communicate the
particular message that he intends to profit from the domain name
when the registrant offers to sell it.4 54  Those who view that con-
duct-the offerees and the court considering bad-faith intent-are
likely to understand that message. With respect to Factor VII, by
providing misleading information when applying for registration of a
domain name, a registrant indisputably intends to communicate a
message, albeit a false one.45 5 The registrar then views and under-
452. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.
453. Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)) (internal quota-
tions marks omitted). See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (recognizing
expressive nature of picketing for cause); Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 313-14 (1968) (same); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1970) (recog-
nizing expressive nature of wearing military uniforms to criticize war); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (recognizing expressive nature of wearing
black armbands to protest war); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (recogniz-
ing expressive nature of a sit-in by blacks in a "whites only" area to protest segregation).
454. See 15 U.S.C. § 1l25(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI) (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 24 (1981) (defining "offer" as "[t]he manifestation of willingness to enter into a bar-
gain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is
invited and will conclude it").
455. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII). The fact that the registrant intends his or
her conduct to denote a message that is itself illegal does not preclude a First Amendment
analysis. In Johnson, the Supreme Court did not state that a First Amendment analysis is only
appropriate where the expression derives from conduct that is legal. See 491 U.S. at 404-05.
To merit a First Amendment analysis, the conduct need only be intended to express thought,
and be received as an expression of thought. Id. The legality of the conduct becomes relevant
once the analysis begins. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
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stands that message. Finally, with respect to Factors VIII and IX, au-
thority suggests that a registrant likely intends to communicate to a
mark holder an intent to profit from the mark within the domain name
simply by possessing a domain name containing another trademark,
456or a domain name containing the famous mark at issue. The same
authority also suggests that the respective mark holders understand
that message.457
A classic example of a cybersquatter displaying an intent to
communicate a particularized message to an audience that under-
stands that message occurred in Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P., v.
Wick.4 58 There, the registrant, Wick, had registered multiple domain
names, some of which were confusingly similar to famous trade-
marks.459 When queried as to his purpose for this conduct, Wick
stated: "this was my way of messing with them .... I mean to see
these people squirming around.., that's enjoyable., 460  Through
these statements, Wick intended to, and did, communicate his disgust
with certain mark holders to the district court. 46 1 The court found a
clear case of bad-faith intent.462 Morrison & Foerster thus demon-
strates an instance where (1) a registrant intended to express a particu-
lar message through conduct and statements, (2) those viewing that
message understood it, and (3) the government stripped the registrant
of property because of that message.463
The same outcome arises in all actionable cybersquatting cases.
Although the factual circumstances of each case are unique, courts
456. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII)-(IX). The legislative history indicates that
a common practice among cybersquatters is to register a domain name containing a trademark,
and then wait for the mark holder to approach the cybersquatter with an offer to purchase the
domain name. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 15-16 (1999); H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 13 (1999).
The Senate Report states: "[Factor VIII] recognizes the increasingly common cybersquatting
practice known as 'warehousing', [sic] in which a cybersquatter registers multiple domain
names .... By sitting on these marks and not making the first move to offer to sell them to
the mark owner, these cybersquatters have been largely successful in evading the case
law .... S. REP. No. 106-140, at 15-16 (1999). This statement implies that the cybersquatter
intends for his or her possession of the domain name to indicate his or her intent to sell the
domain name at a profit, or in other words, to profit from the mark within the domain name.
See id.
457. See supra note 456.
458. 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000).
459. Id. at 1130, 1132-33.
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base their findings of bad-faith intent on conduct that denotes an in-
tent to communicate a particular message.464 That message consists
of an intent to realize an economic gain from the sale of the domain
name containing a trademark.465 Also, in every actionable cyber-
squatting case, the fact that a judge deems that message of economic-
gain intent to be indicative of bad-faith intent compels the conclusion
that the message is understood by its viewers. In accordance with
Texas v. Johnson, then, a First Amendment analysis of the disputed
conduct is necessary.466
(ii) The Government's Interest in Regulating Expressions of Bad-
Faith Intent
According to First Amendment jurisprudence, the government
may not regulate conduct that expresses thought unless one of two
conditions arise: (1) the government has an overriding interest in
regulating the nonspeech element of the conduct,467 or (2) the expres-
sion is constitutionally proscribable. 468 If neither condition applies,
then the legislation is unconstitutional.469
(a) A Governmental Interest in Regulating Conduct
In United States v. O'Brien, the Supreme Court discussed the
conditions that give rise to finding an overriding governmental inter-
est in the nonspeech element of the conduct at issue. 470  There, the
Court upheld a statute prohibiting the burning of selective-service cer-
tificates because the governmental interest in prohibiting that conduct
outweighed the defendant's First Amendment interest in the action's
464. See, e.g., Zipee Corp. v. United States Postal Serv., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1087
(D. Or. 2000) (citing the facts that (1) registrant registered other domain names containing fa-
mous marks, and (2) registrant benefited from increasing traffic to its website, as evidence that
registrant had bad-faith intent).
465. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 277 (5th Cir.
2002) ("The circumstances of this case all indicate that [the Defendant] knew [the Plaintiff]
had a famous mark in which [the Plaintiff] had built up goodwill, and that they hoped to profit
from this by registering [the domain name] and waiting for [the Plaintiff] to contact them so
they could 'assist' [the Plaintiff].").
466. See 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
467. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
468. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-84 (1992).
469. Id. (opining that a content-based regulation of expressive conduct is presumptively
invalid unless the content is constitutionally proscribable).
470. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
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communicative impact. 471 The Court stated: "[W]hen 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms. 4 72 This statement means that the government may restrict
expressions of thought that derive from conduct if the government has
a sufficiently compelling interest in regulating the nonspeech element
of the conduct.4 73 Regulation of the nonspeech element does not con-
cern the message that the conduct expresses as the nonspeech element
of conduct is essentially the conduct itself.474 Absent a regulation of
the conduct itself, then, the government cannot have an interest in a
nonspeech element of conduct.47 5 O'Brien thus implies that although
a law that affects expressive conduct can be justified on the grounds
that the government has an interest in regulating the conduct, that jus-
tification fails if the law does not in fact regulate conduct.
Here, the ACPA does not regulate any conduct at all; the statute
regulates only the thought that is inferred from the conduct.4 76 For in-
stance, offering to sell a domain name is not prohibited conduct under
the ACPA;477 rather, the "bad-faith" thoughts that a court infers from
that conduct are actionable.478 Consequently, the ACPA does not
regulate the nonspeech element of the conduct: no conduct is at issue.
The ACPA regulates only the speech element.
A statute analogous to the ACPA under the facts of O'Brien
would consist of a law prohibiting any expressed thoughts of disinter-
471. Id. at 382.
472. Id. at 376.
473. Id. The Court set forth a four-prong test for determining whether the govern-
ment's interest was sufficiently compelling; see id. at 377. The government regulation is justi-
fied only if: (1) the regulation is within the constitutional powers of the government; (2) the
regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental in-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on the ex-
pression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest. Id.
474. Id. at 381-82.
475. See id.
476. See discussion supra Part V.A. 1; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) (2000).
477. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 15 (1999) ("[The ACPA] does not suggest that a court
should consider the mere offer to sell a domain name to a mark owner ... sufficient to indicate
bad faith. Indeed, there are cases in which a person registers a name in anticipation of a busi-
ness venture that simply never pans out. And someone who has a legitimate registration of a
domain name that mirrors someone else's domain name, such as a trademark owner... may,
in fact, wish to sell that name to the other trademark owner. This bill does not imply that these
facts are an indication of bad-faith. It merely provides a court with the necessary discretion to
recognize the evidence of bad-faith when it is present.").
478. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1).
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est in the draft-labeled as "bad-faith intent"--and the conduct of
ripping up a draft card would evidence that disinterest, yet the con-
duct itself would not be prohibited. Under that scenario, the govern-
ment would have no interest in regulating conduct because the hypo-
thetical statute, like the ACPA, would only regulate intent. Unlike the
actual statute in O 'Brien, the hypothetical statute would not be justi-
fied on the grounds that the government has an interest in regulating
the conduct. 479 No justifying governmental interest can exist in the
absence of any regulation of conduct. Thus, where the bad-faith con-
duct serves only as evidence of a bad-faith intent-as in the ACPA-
the regulation at issue is not a justified regulation of conduct.
Another Supreme Court case that is instructive in determining
whether the government has an overriding interest in regulating con-
duct is R.A. V v. City of St. Paul.4 80 There, the Court struck down a
statute that banned the action of burning crosses while having knowl-
edge that the burning would arouse anger.481 The Court stated that
"[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid" under the
First Amendment.482 Based on this rule, the statute at issue was un-
constitutional because "it prohibit[ed] otherwise permitted speech
solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresse[d]. 483 In other
words, the restriction was unconstitutional because the only differ-
ence between the protected speech of burning crosses and the prohib-
ited conduct was the defendant's intent to have that expressive con-
duct address a specific audience.484 R.A. V. therefore suggests that a
governmental interest in regulating a nonspeech element is not pres-
ent where the regulation turns on the speaker's intent.
Like the statute in R.A. V., the ACPA inheres a content-based re-
striction based on a speaker's intent. The ACPA's restriction on bad-
faith intent prohibits the content of the thought inferred from a regis-
trant's conduct.485 Because the ACPA does not actually prohibit the
conduct giving rise to a court's inference of bad faith, the content of
the thought that the conduct expresses is the only actionable ele-
479. Cf O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 380 (finding a government interest in regulating the con-
duct of destroying draft cards).
480. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
481. Id at 380,396.
482. Id. at 382. The presumption of unconstitutionality remains valid only if the con-
tent-based regulation is not constitutionally proscribable. Id. at 383.
483. Id at 381.
484. See id.
485. 15 U.S.C § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
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ment.486  The conduct denoting bad-faith intent is merely the means
whereby a court may determine (1) that a registrant expresses certain
thoughts, and (2) that those thoughts are impermissible.487 Thus, the
ACPA has the unusual characteristic of punishing thoughts expressed
through conduct without regulating the conduct itself. The ACPA
punishes only the content of thought.4 8 It is therefore presumptively
invalid.489
(b) Constitutionally Proscribable Speech
The fact that the government may not have an overriding interest
in regulating the conduct giving rise to a bad-faith intent does not im-
ply that the ACPA's regulation of expressed thoughts is necessarily
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The government can
rebut the presumption that legislation is invalid under the First
Amendment by showing that the legislation regulates constitutionally
proscribable content.490 The content at issue here-thoughts of profit-
ing from a mark-is commercial in nature.49 1  Accordingly, the
486. Id. For instance, the ACPA treats the action of offering to sell a domain name to a
mark holder as evidence of a bad-faith intent; the act itself is not unlawful. See S. REP. NO.
106-140, at 15 (1999) ("[S]omeone who has a legitimate registration of a domain name that
mirrors someone else's domain name, such as a trademark owner... may, in fact, wish to sell
that [domain] name to the other trademark owner. This bill does not imply that these facts are
an indication of bad-faith.").
487. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 15 (1999) ("[The ACPA] merely provides a court with
the necessary discretion to recognize the evidence of bad-faith intent when it is present.").
488. The ACPA appears to effect a content-based restriction more so than the statute in
R.A. V. Whereas the R.A. V. statute included an action-cross-burning-as part of the regula-
tion, see R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380, the ACPA imposes liability for owning a domain name with
a bad-faith intent, see discussion supra Part IV.A. 1. Ownership is not an act; it is a state of
legal relationship that a person has against all other claimants to a specific res. See EPSTEIN,
supra note 321, at 58-59 ("[R]ights of ownership in a given thing consist in a set of rights of
infinite duration, good against the rest of the world .. "). Consequently, while it is at least
arguable that the R.A. V. statute was not content-based because it regulated the act of cross-
burning, no such argument can be made under the ACPA. The ACPA must be a content-based
regulation.
489. SeeR.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.
490. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-83. Examples of constitutionally proscribable areas of
speech include obscenity, defamation, and "fighting words." Id. at 383 (citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942)).
491. The Supreme Court has defined "commercial speech" to mean "expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); see also Bd. of Trs. of the
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989) (defining conduct as constituting
commercial speech if it "propose[s] a commercial transaction" (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)) (interpreting Pittsburg Press
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ACPA's regulation of these expressed thoughts is constitutional only
insofar as the commercial speech is constitutionally proscribable.
The Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he Constitution...
accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other consti-
tutionally guaranteed expression. 'A92 Nevertheless, "[i]n applying the
First Amendment to this area, [the Court] ha[s] rejected the 'highly
paternalistic' view that government has complete power to suppress
or regulate commercial speech. '' 93 The Court defined the scope of
protection that the First Amendment affords commercial speech in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of New York, where it laid out a two-step balancing test comprising
four questions.494 The first step of the Central Hudson test consists of
examining (1) whether the commercial speech "concern[s] lawful ac-
tivity" and is not misleading, and (2) whether "the asserted govern-
mental interest is substantial. ' ' 9S Only if both inquiries yield positive
answers does the second step follow. 496 The second step consists of
examining (3) whether "the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted" and (4) whether that regulation "is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
',497
Both the cybersquatter and the government appear to pass the
first step of the Central Hudson test. First, the expressed thought that
the statute regulates-an intent to profit from a mark-concerns law-
ful activity, and it is not misleading.498 Part III establishes that under
Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973))).
492. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63; accord Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
493. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562.




498. This first prong distinguishes the ACPA from possession-plus-intent narcotics
laws in a constitutional sense. Because liability under the ACPA stems from possession of a
certain sort of property-domain names-plus an intent to do something with the property, the
ACPA is similar to narcotics laws that punish possession of a controlled substance with an in-
tent to distribute the substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000). The conditions for liability are
similar: possession plus intent. Id. § 841(a). Unlike the ACPA, however, the narcotics law is
not unconstitutional under the First Amendment even though it punishes an expressed
thought-the expressed intent to distribute a controlled substance. That expressed thought is
commercial in nature as it concerns the economic interests of the distributor, see Cent. Hud-
son, 447 U.S. at 561, and it concerns unlawful activity--distributing an illegal substance. Un-
der the first prong of the Central Hudson test, the regulation of the expressed thought about
distributing a controlled substance is constitutional because the thought concerns unlawful ac-
tivity. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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traditional trademark law, a registrant may lawfully profit from a
trademark contained within a domain name. Although it is unlawful
to infringe or dilute a trademark by commercially using a domain
name, the expressed thoughts at issue do not concern infringement or
dilution. The thoughts at issue merely focus on profiting from a mark
by selling a domain name that is not used commercially. Further-
more, the ACPA itself does not prohibit the act of profiting from the
mark.499 The thoughts constituting bad-faith intent concern lawful ac-
tivity.
The expressions of bad-faith intent are not misleading because
the expressed thought must be true to be actionable under the ACPA.
The fact that a thought is actionable implies that its expression, upon
which a court determines what the thought actually is, is an accurate
representation of that thought. To be actionable, an expression of
bad-faith intent must be a true reflection of that intent. The expres-
sions of thought at issue are not misleading.
Second, the government appears to have two substantial interests
in regulating the registrant's commercial expressions of thought. The
legislative history indicates that the following government interests
underlie the ACPA: (1) to promote online commerce by enabling
Internet consumers to readily identify websites associated with the
mark holder; and (2) to promote the effectiveness of the trademark
system by precluding a third party from realizing the value of the
mark in a domain name. 500 The first interest appears to be substantial
because by ensuring that mark holders possess the domain names that
correspond to their websites, the statute arguably fosters an efficient
forum for commercial activity. If a domain name were to correspond
with a trademark, then merely by typing a trademark as a domain
name would a consumer be able to locate the corresponding website.
Cybersquatters bottleneck this process by hoarding domain names
containing trademarks. 50 1 The government therefore appears to have
a substantial interest in providing an efficient method for locating a
499. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1; S. REP. No. 106-140, at 12-13 (1999).
500. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4-7 ("The purpose of the [ACPA] is to protect consumers
and American businesses, to promote the growth of online commerce, and to provide clarity in
the law for trademark owners .... The practice of cybersquatting harms consumers, electronic
commerce, and the goodwill equity of valuable U.S. brand names, upon which consumers in-
creasingly rely to locate the true source of genuine goods and services on the Internet. Online
consumers have a difficult time distinguishing a genuine site from a pirate site .... Legisla-
tion is needed... to protect consumers, promote the continued growth of electronic com-
merce, and protect the goodwill of American businesses.").
501. See id. at 5.
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mark holder's website: online consumers can readily navigate the
Internet. °2
The second government interest is to preclude a third party from
realizing profits that result from the mark holder's efforts to promote
the goodwill of the mark.5 °3 Prohibiting a registrant from realizing
such undeserved economic gain will protect the effectiveness of the
trademark system.50 4  The policy underlying the federal trademark
system is to protect the economic gain associated with a mark
holder's efforts to promote the mark.50 5 Even though the cybersquat-
ter does not violate trademark law, profiting from the mark contained
within the domain name disrupts the policy underlying that law.50 6
Hence, the ACPA's regulation of the expressed thought arguably al-
lows the trademark system to function more efficiently as the mark
holder's efforts to promote the mark are rewarded to the mark holder,
rather than a free-riding cybersquatter.
Although the government passes the first step of the Central
Hudson test, it fails the second step. An examination of the ACPA's
regulation of the expressed thought reveals that the ACPA fails to di-
rectly advance the first government interest, and that the regulation is
not tailored in a reasonable manner to achieve the second governmen-
tal interest. 507 The Supreme Court has defined the third prong of the
Central Hudson test-whether the regulation directly advances the
government interest-as meaning that "a governmental body seeking
to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that
the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate
them to a material degree., 50 8 The Court further pointed out that "the
party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the
burden of justifying it."
509
Under this standard, the government appears unable to justify its
first interest in regulating a registrant's expressed thought.510 Regu-
502. See id
503. Id. at 4-5.
504. See id.
505. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 2:2.
506. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4-6.
507. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
508. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
509. Id. at 770 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20
(1983)).
510. It appears that regulation of expressed intent would directly advance the govern-
ment's second interest in prohibiting third-party registrants from realizing the profit of a mark
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lating the expressed bad-faith intent does not directly advance the in-
terest of ensuring that consumers can easily identify a mark holder's
website. As a preliminary matter, the government interest in provid-
ing an efficient forum for commercial activity appears to be accom-
plished without the ACPA's regulation of expressed intent. Courts
have recognized that consumers can easily navigate the Internet
through Internet search engines.51' Inputting a trademark as an entry
in a search engine will bring up the mark holder's website as one of
the first few "hits." 512 The only cost of using a search engine is the
time it takes to type in a trademark name, which is the same cost of
using a domain name to locate a mark holder's website. Moreover,
using a search engine is arguably a more effective method for locating
a mark holder's website than is inputting a mark as the domain name.
Consumers do not know whether the mark holder employs the full
expression of the mark as the domain name. For instance, a consumer
would not know whether the Dallas Morning News is found at
www.TheDallas MorningNews.com, www.DMnews.com, or
www.dallasmorningnews.com. Additionally, consumers do not know
which domain-name suffix-e.g., .com, .net, .org, .biz-corresponds
with the mark holder's domain name. In short, a consumer's guess
regarding the form of the trademark that would serve as a domain
name is not as accurate as the information that a search engine pro-
vides. So rather than guessing the trademark holder's domain name,
consumers identify the mark holder's website through a search en-
gine. Therefore, the alleged problem giving rise to the first govern-
mental interest appears nonextant.
Assuming arguendo that the purported navigational problem
were to exist, the regulation of suppressing the expressed thoughts
does not directly advance the government's interest in resolving that
problem. Suppressing thoughts of intent does not facilitate a means
for Internet consumers to find a mark holder's website. The ACPA's
remedy-transferring the domain name-might serve that interest,
513
holder. A great majority of, if not all, registrants who sell domain names to mark holders
likely intend to profit from that sale, which profit is a direct reflection of the mark's value.
(This does not imply, however, that a great majority of registrants who have a bad-faith intent
actually do sell the domain names at a profit.)
511. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 655
(E.D. Mich. 2001); Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
512. Greatdomains.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 655; Strick, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
513. The transfer remedy "might" further the interest only to the extent that an Internet
consumer knows the domain name that the mark holder has chosen to represent the mark. See
discussion infra Part V.B. 1.a(ii)(b). Also, the transfer remedy can only further the interest if
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but the regulation itself does not. The regulation at issue-sup-
pressing expressed bad-faith intent-does nothing to create an effi-
cient forum of online commerce. It is the ACPA's remedy that does.
This conclusion is apparent when contemplating a remedy different
from a domain name transfer: if the remedy were only a fine, and not
a transfer of property rights, Internet consumers would be wholly un-
affected with regard to their ability to identify a mark holder's web-
site. Thus, although the ACPA's remedy may further the govern-
ment's first interest, the ACPA's regulation of expressed thought fails
to advance that interest. The first government interest does not satisfy
the second step of the Central Hudson test.
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test involves showing
that the regulation is not more extensive than is necessary. 51 4 In
Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, the Su-
preme Court explained that this criterion does not mean that the gov-
ernment must show that the regulation is the least restrictive means
available.515 The Court opined that this criterion requires only
a "'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to ac-
complish those ends"-a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but rea-
sonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition
but one whose scope is "in proportion to the interest served;" that
employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but ... ameans
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.
516
A reasonable fit-narrowly tailored to the objective sought, yet not
necessarily the least restrictive means-is all that the last prong of the
Central Hudson test requires.517 Nevertheless, the government "must
affirmatively establish the reasonable fit .... The means need not
be the most efficient, but it must be affirmatively established as a rea-
sonable fit in accomplishing the governmental interest.
519
The second governmental interest-prohibiting a third-party reg-
istrant from extracting the economic value of a mark-fails this
prong. A registrant could exhibit expressions of bad-faith intent un-
the mark holder posts a website-a condition that may not necessarily occur.
514. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
515. 492 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1989); accord Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71
(1993) (defining this prong of the Central Hudson test to mean that the government must dem-
onstrate that the harms the regulation recites are real and that the restriction will "alleviate
them to a material degree").




WILLAMETTE LA W REVIEW
der the ACPA yet not intend to realize the value of the mark in the
domain name.5 20  For instance, a registrant could register multiple
domain names containing famous marks merely because the registrant
intends to prevent the mark holder from registering them. As in Mor-
rison & Foerster, the registrant could do so out of spite towards the
mark holder, but with no intention of realizing any economic gain.52'
Or alternatively, as in Sporty's Farm, the registrant could be a com-
petitor with a mark holder, and register the domain name simply to
preclude the mark holder from doing so. 522  The bad-faith intent in
these cases did not suggest that the registrant intended to extract the
mark's value from the domain name.523 Instead, the opposite was
true; the registrant intended not to sell it so as to prohibit the mark
holder from ever extracting the mark's value.524 Prohibiting expres-
sions of bad-faith intent therefore appears excessively broad for the
narrow purpose of prohibiting a third party from realizing the value of
a mark. The second government interest fails the second step of the
Central Hudson test.
5 25
520. See, e.g., Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 499 (2d Cir.
2000); Morrison & Foerster L.L.P. v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131-33 (D. Col. 2000).
521. 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1133 (finding bad-faith intent because the defendant registered
the domain names as his "way of messing with" the plaintiffs).
522. 202 F.3d at 499.
523. See id; Morrison & Foerster, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1131-33.
524. See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499; Morrison & Foerster, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
525. Further support for the conclusion that the ACPA unconstitutionally suppresses
commercial speech arises out of Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85 (1977). Although the Supreme Court had not yet articulated the four-part test of Cen-
tral Hudson when it ruled in Linmark, Linmark's holding is consistent with that test. See Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565 n.7 (1980). In
Linmark, a municipal ordinance prohibited posting "For Sale" or "Sold" signs in a residential
area for the purpose of preventing "panic selling" among white homeowners who feared racial
integration in the community. 431 U.S. at 87-88, 94. The Court noted that this regulation fo-
cused purely on the content of the homeowners' communication, rather than on the form. Id
at 94. The government's interest in suppressing this content was to prevent a high racial turn-
over in a short period of time so as to prevent a reduction in property values. Id. at 90-91, 94-
95. While acknowledging that this interest was important, the Court proceeded to hold the
ordinance unconstitutional. Id. at 95, 98. Dispositive to the Court's holding was the fact that
the ordinance dealt "with the substance of the information communicated to [the municipal-
ity's] citizens." Id. at 96. The municipality "acted to prevent its residents from obtaining cer-
tain information." Id. The Court rejected the municipality's "paternalistic" rationale that sup-
pressing information that was neither false nor misleading was the best way to benefit the
citizens. Id. at 97.
Like the ordinance in Linmark, the ACPA suppresses the substance of the information
that a registrant communicates to an audience-mark holders. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 15-
16 (1999) (stating that the ACPA denies registrants the opportunity to communicate an intent
to sell the domain names when they "warehouse" them). The ACPA precludes the expressed
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Thus, the commercial content of a cybersquatter's expressive
conduct is not constitutionally proscribable. The unconstitutionality
of the ACPA stems from the simple problem that it prohibits the ex-
pression of an idea-the idea to profit from a trademark. As the Su-
preme Court has stated, "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself of-
fensive or disagreeable. 526  The abhorrent, inequitable nature of a
cybersquatter's idea is not a constitutional reason to ban that idea.527
Because regulating a registrant's bad-faith intent appears uncon-
stitutional under the First Amendment, the argument that the ACPA
only regulates a single property right of the ACPA-the right to in-
tend to use the domain name in a specific manner-must fail. The
thought about profiting from a trademark to protect the mark holder from obtaining that infor-
mation. Specifically, by barring the cybersquatter's expressions of an intent to sell the domain
name, the government protects the mark holder from acting on that information in a way that
would be to the mark holder's detriment. Barring the registrant's intent to sell precludes a
mark holder from buying the domain name-a course of action that the government deems to
be not in the mark holder's best interest. See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 6 (1999) (opining that
the ACPA is needed to prevent mark holders from paying "extortionate" prices for domain
names). The ACPA therefore bars the content of an expressed thought to protect the interests
of the audience-the mark holders. And like the ordinance in Linmark, the expressed content
is neither false nor misleading. See discussion supra Part V.B. l.a(ii)(b). The holding of Lin-
mark therefore applies: the "paternalistic" prohibition is constitutionally infirm because the
statute impairs "the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information." Linmark, 431
U.S. at 97-98.
526. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
527. It should be noted that the doctrine of likelihood-of-confusion is constitutional un-
der this interpretation of the First Amendment. Under the likelihood-of-confusion doctrine,
courts examine an unauthorized junior mark user's intent in order to determine trademark li-
ability. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). But the
intent is not the basis for attaching liability; instead, the use is. Courts determine whether a
junior user has used a trademark in a manner that is likely to result in consumer confusion, and
in so doing, consider whether the defendant intended to gain a commercial advantage over the
mark holder. See id.; Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark Infringement: The Role
of Bad Faith in Awarding an Accounting of Defendant's Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
863, 924 (2002) (concluding that bad-faith intent is not a requirement to award an accounting
of profits under trademark infringement). Intent is evidence of actual conduct, i.e., a use that
is likely to result in confusion.
In contrast to the likelihood-of-confusion doctrine, the ACPA defines a defendant's intent
as the actual "use" that a defendant is prohibited from engaging in. See discussion supra Part
IV. Under the ACPA, intent is the basis for transferring property, whereas under likelihood-
of-confusion law, intent is evidence of a physical action occurring-a use causing consumer
confusion-which action is punished. Although subtle, the distinction between the ways that
the likelihood-of-confusion doctrine and the ACPA treat a defendant's intent has gross impli-
cations under First Amendment law. Viewing expressed intent (speech) as evidence of wrong-
ful conduct raises no First Amendment concerns; viewing expressed intent (speech) as wrong-
ful conduct in and of itself does trigger a First Amendment analysis.
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unconstitutionality of the regulation prohibits that regulation from
serving as a basis for the ACPA's remedy - i.e., complete appropria-
tion of the domain name. In effect, the ACPA effects a complete ap-
propriation without the registrant having committed any unlawful use,
for the First Amendment prohibits the ACPA from regulating the
"use" that it purports to regulate. The ACPA is therefore a statute that
enables complete appropriation of property for no justifiable reason.
As a statute that enables complete appropriation of property, the
ACPA fails the first prong of the Penn Central balancing test: the
character of the government action is a physical invasion of property.
Since a physical appropriation always effects a compensable taking,
the other two factors of the Penn Central test need not be ad-
dressed.528 The Fifth Amendment requires that the government com-
pensate cybersquatters for the government's exercise of eminent do-
main over their domain-name property.
b. Stripping Property Rights to Domain Names Based on Lawful
Ownership of Property
Even if the property "use" that the ACPA prohibits were a con-
stitutional basis for regulating domain-name property, the statute
would still effect a complete appropriation of the property, and not
merely a regulation of a single use. As discussed below, this conclu-
sion follows because the regulation of bad-faith intent enables courts
to strip a registrant of all property rights for no other reason than the
fact that the registrant is a lawful property owner. 529 The ensuing two
subsections argue that the ACPA permits courts to find bad-faith in-
tent based solely on the fact that a registrant owns property.
(i) Bad-Faith Intent Based on Mere Ownership of Domain Names
Two of the ACPA factors, from which a court may infer bad-
faith intent, describe nothing more than a registrant's rightful owner-
ship of property. These two are Factors VIII and IX.530 Factor VIII
allows a court to infer bad-faith intent if a registrant possesses multi-
ple domain names that contain trademarks that were distinctive or fa-
mous at the time they were registered. 53' This factor is problematic
528. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
529. See discussion infra Part V.B.l.b(i)-(ii).
530. 15 U.S.C. § l 125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII)-(IX) (2000).
531. See id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII). See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs
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because it does not base its finding of bad-faith intent on any use that
a registrant makes of the domain name at issue. Instead, the regula-
tion is based on ownership of other property. 532  Ownership of that
other property-multiple domain names containing distinctive or fa-
mous trademarks-is not in and of itself illegal.533 Thus, Factor VIII
strips a registrant of property solely on the basis that the registrant
lawfully owns other property. Herein lies a contradiction: the regis-
trant lawfully owns the other domain names, but the registrant is pun-
ished for owning those domain names. Legal justification for strip-
ping a registrant of the disputed domain name is therefore lacking
under Factor VIII because ownership of the other domain names is
not unlawful. Government appropriation of property based on a per-
son's lawful ownership of other property appears to be an illusory
"regulation" of the appropriated property. Under Factor VIII, then,
the ACPA enables the government to appropriate a domain name
without conditioning that appropriation on any prohibited use specific
to that domain name. Factor VIII effects a complete appropriation.
Factor IX is likewise problematic. It enables a court to infer
bad-faith intent when the domain name in dispute is highly famous
and distinctive. 534  Factor IX transfers ownership of a domain name
Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 276 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding bad-faith intent based on defendant's registra-
tion of other domain names, even though the defendant had not offered to sell the domain
name at issue).
Notably, Factor VIII states that bad-faith intent may be inferred "without regard to the
goods or services of the parties." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII). This statement implies
that the registrant need not commit a commercial use of the mark as defined in § 1127. Sec-
tion 1127 requires that a person use a mark on goods or services to find that the person has
made a "commercial use" of the mark. Id. § 1127. Accordingly, if a registrant can have a bad-
faith intent "without regard to the goods or services of the parties," a registrant can have a bad-
faith intent without making a commercial use of the mark. See id.
532. In Prime Publishers, Inc. v. American-Republican, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 266, 281
(D. Conn. 2001), the federal district court held that Factor ViII was not necessarily limited to
ownership of other domain names. The court stated: "Although [Factor VIII] refers to the reg-
istration of 'multiple' domain names, we find that the registration of a single domain name
with the knowledge that it incorporates a competitor's mark similarly informs an inference of
bad faith intent." Id. The court proceeded to find a bad-faith intent based on evidence that the
defendant had registered the disputed domain name with the knowledge that it incorporated a
competitor's mark. Id.
533. As discussed in Part III, ownership of a domain name does not violate the tradi-
tional doctrines of trademark law. And as discussed in Part 1V.A. 1, the ACPA attaches liabil-
ity for bad-faith intent-not for an act, i.e., ownership of multiple domain names, that suggests
the bad-faith intent.
534. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX); see, e.g., Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of
Am., Inc. 238 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing the fact that the trademark at issue is fa-
mous as evidence of a bad-faith intent); Nike, Inc. v. Circle Group Internet, Inc., 318 F. Supp.
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based on a court's determination that the res has a certain characteris-
tic. 535 That is, Factor IX does not imply bad-faith intent based on any
use that a registrant performs with the domain name; rather, posses-
sion of a domain name that has a certain characteristic-a similarity
to a highly famous and distinctive mark-implies actionable bad-faith
536intent. Ironically, a registrant may legally own the disputed domain
name under Factor IX. 537 As stated above, the ACPA's regulation is
only a means for inferring bad-faith intent; the bad-faith intent factors
do not actually prohibit any actions or ownership of property.538
Thus, while ownership of a domain name that contains a trademark
that is highly famous and distinctive is legal under the ACPA, that
ownership is nevertheless a basis for inferring bad-faith intent, and
that bad-faith intent is the basis for stripping a registrant of ownership
rights. Simply stated, Factor IX allows the government to deprive a
registrant of property solely because the registrant owns that property.
The rationale for stripping a registrant of property based on Factor IX
amounts to circular reasoning. Accordingly, appropriating a regis-
trant's domain name based on Factor IX does not merely reflect a
remedy for violating a regulated use; domain-name deprivation under
Factor IX represents an appropriation of property because the regis-
trant owns the property. It is a naked appropriation for no legally jus-
tifiable reason.
(ii) Bad-Faith Intent Based on Precluding a Mark Holder from
Owning a Domain Name
In addition to the problematic nature of inferring bad-faith intent
from Factors VIII and IX, courts have defined bad-faith intent to
mean the exercise of a fundamental property right. The ACPA allows
courts to find a bad-faith intent based on circumstances that are not
listed in the statute's factors. 9 Under that grant of discretion, courts
2d 688, 692 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (opining that knowledge of the famous mark suggests a bad-faith
intent).
535. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX).
536. See id.
537. As discussed above, the ACPA does not prohibit mere ownership of any sort of
domain name containing a trademark. See discussion supra Part IV (opining that the ACPA
attaches liability for possession plus intent); H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 12 (1999) ("[The
ACPA] does not suggest that a court should consider the mere offer to sell a domain name to a
mark owner ... sufficient to indicate bad faith.").
538. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
539. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) ("In determining whether a person has a bad faith
intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, but not limited
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have defined bad-faith intent to include a registrant's specific intent to
preclude a mark holder from owning the registrant's domain name.
540
Sporty's Farm is illustrative. 541 As a benchmark decision that courts
have uniformly accepted as a correct application of the ACPA,
Sporty's Farm reflects the prevailing view of circumstances that con-
stitute bad-faith intent.542 The Second Circuit found that a registrant
possessed a bad-faith intent because the registrant specifically in-
tended to preclude the mark holder from using the domain name.543
In the words of the court, the defendant had "registered [the domain
name] for the primary purpose of keeping [the plaintiff] from using
that domain name," and so the defendant possessed a bad-faith in-
tent.544 Hence, the Sporty's Farm court revoked a registrant's prop-
erty rights because of the registrant's thoughts about ensuring that a
mark holder could not procure the domain name.545 Stated another
way, the court held that the authority of the ACPA allows a court to
strip a registrant of property rights where the registrant has an intent
to assert a claim of ownership against a specific person.
546
In light of the definition of property, the holding of Sporty's
Farm is problematic. Property represents the legal relationship be-
to ....") (emphasis added).
540. See, e.g., Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 499 (2d Cir.
2000); Morrison & Foerster L.L.P., v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131-33 (D. Col. 2000).
541. 202 F.3d at 499.
542. Cases that have recognized Sporty's Farm as a correct statement of law include:
Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 809 (6th Cir. 2004); Mattel, Inc.
v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 2002); Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Por-
sche.Net, 302 F.3d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 2002); Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.
238 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270,
276 (5th Cir. 2002); N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57, 66 (1st Cir. 2001);
Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3rd Cir. 2001); People for Ethical Treatment of Ani-
mals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 368 (4th Cir. 2001); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.,
232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2000).
543. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499; see also Prime Publishers, Inc. v. American-
Republican, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 266, 281 (D. Conn. 2001) (finding a bad-faith intent based
on the registrant's knowledge that the domain name incorporated the trademark of a competi-
tor).
544. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499.
545. See id
546. Accord Morrison & Foerster L.L.P., v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131-33 (D.
Col. 2000). In Morrison & Foerster, the court relied on Sporty's Farm to find a bad-faith in-
tent. Id. at 1133. There, the defendant registered domain names containing trademarks of fa-
mous corporations for the purpose of "messing with" the corporations. Id This factual cir-
cumstance strongly suggested that the defendant registered the domain names for the purpose
of precluding the mark holders from registering them. Relying on Sporty's Farm, the court
held that this purpose was sufficient to find a bad-faith intent. Id.
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tween a claimant and all others with respect to a res.547 A registrant's
property rights include the right to assert a claim to the domain name
against every other possible claimant, including a mark holder. 48
More precisely, according to the meaning of property, a rightful
owner of a domain name can intend to preclude a mark holder from
using the domain name.549 The ACPA thus strips a registrant of prop-
erty rights based solely on the fact that the registrant asserts a valid
property right-the right to preclude any person from using that prop-
erty. That a registrant intends to preclude a mark holder from possess-
ing the registrant's domain name is therefore not a valid basis for re-
voking the registrant's property rights. As interpreted by Sporty's
Farm, the ACPA allows courts to transfer property rights merely be-
cause the registrant treats the domain name as property. 550 The statute
effects a naked appropriation of property.
2. The Economic Impact of the Governmental Action
Assuming arguendo that the character of the governmental ac-
tion is not a physical appropriation of the domain name, it is neces-
sary to examine the second and third factors in the Penn Central bal-
ancing test to determine whether the ACPA enables a taking.551 As
stated above, the second Penn Central factor is the economic impact
of the governmental action on the property.552 With respect to real
property, if the regulation "denies all economically beneficial or pro-
ductive use of land," then the action constitutes a taking.553 With re-
spect to personal property, the economic impact that a government ac-
tion effects is usually of no constitutional consequence.554 The
547. EPSTEIN, supra note 321, at 58-59 ("[R]ights of ownership in a given thing consist




550. See 202 F.3d at 499.
551. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
552. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see dis-
cussion supra Part V.B. 1.
553. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992); Agins v. City of
Tiburton, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
554. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28 ("[I]n the case of personal property, by reason of the
State's traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, [the owner] ought to be
aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically
worthless (at least if the property's only economically productive use is sale or manufacture
for sale).").
[41:1
2005] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING ACT 85
Supreme Court has specifically held that regulations that strip per-
sonal property of value because of a governmental restriction on the
sale of the property are not unconstitutional.555
This factor appears to weigh in favor of the government. Do-
main names seem to be personal property.556 The economic impact of
prohibiting a registrant from thinking about selling the domain name
to profit from a trademark is accordingly of no consequence. 557 Thus,
this factor does not imply that prohibiting an intent to sell domain
names results in a taking.
555. Id.
556. See Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that a domain
name is "obviously ... not real estate"); BLACK'S, supra note 48, at 1233 (defining personal
property to be "[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not classi-
fied as real property").
An argument exists, however, that domain names are not personal property, but rather are
a new form of real property. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBER-
SPACE 63-84 (1999) (arguing that the data structure of code has evolved into a new form of
space-cyberspace-that functions similar to, and plays the same role as, real space); DAVID
WEINBERGER, SMALL PIECES LOOSELY JOINED 27-56 (2002) (opining that an Internet user
engages in a spatial experience); see also Solomons v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 479, 483 (Ct.
Cl. 1886) (stating that the "mind-work of the inventor.., is closer in analogy to real than to
personal estate"), aff'd, 137 U.S. 342 (1890). As stated above, by representing a data ar-
rangement on the spectrum of possible Internet addresses, a domain name is analogous to a
plot of land. See discussion supra Part V.A. 1 .b(i). Reserving the right to use the domain-
name data arrangement essentially reserves a space on the Internet to post a website, much like
reserving a plot of land reserves a space to build a structure. See id Thus, domain names
could be viewed as real property in a virtual medium.
If the argument were true that a domain name constitutes a virtual form of real property,
then it is arguable that the second factor of the Penn Central test suggests that the ACPA ef-
fects a taking. By prohibiting a registrant who possesses a domain name containing a mark
from contemplating selling that domain name for a profit, the ACPA effectively denies the
registrant all economically beneficial use of the domain name. The only economically benefi-
cial use of such a domain name appears to be selling it for a profit, for the registrant cannot
post any commercial website at the domain name without violating the doctrines of dilution or
infringement. See discussion supra Part III.B. 1. The traditional trademark doc-trines and the
ACPA regulation against intending to profit from the trademark together function to deny a
registrant of any economically viable use of the property, much like regulations do in the con-
text of land ownership. The analogous situation in the land context would be regulations that
prohibit a landowner from (1) building any commercially valuable structure on the land, (2)
extracting valuable minerals under the land, and (3) intending to sell the land for the purpose
of profiting from those minerals. Such a land regulation would constitute a taking because it
denies the owner of all economically viable use of the land. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20.
Likewise, the ACPA and the traditional doctrines of trademark function together to deny a cy-
bersquatter of all economically viable use of a domain name.
557. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
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3. The ACPA's Interference with Reasonable Investment-Backed
Expectations
The third factor in the Penn Central balancing test addresses
whether the regulation interferes with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations.558 Under this factor, the Supreme Court has analyzed the
extent to which legislation is retroactive in nature. 559 The Court has
on several occasions expressed that retroactive legislation violates the
Takings Clause.560 In Calder v. Bull, the Court first suggested that the
Takings Clause provides a safeguard against the government retroac-
tively legislating property rights.56' The Court later stated in Land-
graf v. USI Film Products that:
It is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle
finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution.... The
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and
other government actors) from depriving private persons of vested
property rights except for a "public use" and upon payment of
"just compensation."
The Court emphasized the policy underlying these antiretroactivity
provisions in the following words:
[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted
in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older
than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate
that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law
is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations
should not be lightly disrupted.
563
The Supreme Court appears to have made clear, then, that as a general
rule the Takings Clause prohibits retroactive legislation that deprives
a person of property.
558. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
559. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-29 (1998) (plurality); Concrete
Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645-46
(1993); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1986).
560. See, e.g., E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 533 ("Our Constitution expresses concern with
retroactive laws through several of its provisions, including the Ex Post Facto and Takings
Clauses."); United States v. Sec. Ind. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982) (expressing "substantial
doubt" whether the retroactive provision of a bankruptcy code provision comported with the
Fifth Amendment); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935)
(declaring a bankruptcy law to be an unconstitutional taking where it affected substantive
rights acquired before the provision was adopted).
561. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394 (1798) (Chase, J.).
562. 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994).
563. Id. at 265.
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Supreme Court precedent has defined any exception to this gen-
eral rule narrowly, so that retroactive legislation is constitutional only
if it is "confined to short and limited periods required by the practi-
calities of producing national legislation .... ."564 For instance, the
Court permitted retroactive legislation in Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp., where a disputed law covered a short, limited time
period.565 There, companies were withdrawing from a government
insurance program without facing liability for the actions that the
companies had committed while members of the program. 566 Con-
gress passed a law that forced these withdrawing companies to be li-
able for their past actions committed while members of the pro-
gram.567 Although the companies had entered the program with the
understanding that they could withdraw without being liable for their
past actions, the Court held that the new retroactive law did not upset
the reasonable expectations of the contractual property owners.568
The Court observed that the retroactive application was limited to the
569time period that the companies participated in the program. It also
noted that producing a national pension law required this retroactive
legislation to safeguard against the individual members' liabilities
which could threaten that plan.57°
Another example of retroactive property legislation was manifest
when the Supreme Court found constitutional a law that retroactively
amended an income tax statute. 57 1 There again, the retroactivity was
limited to a relatively short duration, and it seemed necessary given
the practicalities of producing a national tax plan.572 Thus, any excep-
tion to the general rule that retroactive legislation of property rights is
a taking appears to require that the retroactivity cover only a short,
limited period, and that it be pragmatically necessary to produce na-
tional legislation.
The ACPA upsets a registrant's investment-backed expectations
because it is retroactive. The ACPA's prohibition against an intent to
564. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 731 (1984) (quot-
ing United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1981) (per curiam)); E. Enters., 524
U.S. at 528.
565. 475 U.S. 211, 222-28 (1986).
566. Id. at 216.
567. Id. at216-17.
568. Id. at 226-27.
569. Id.
570. Id. at 227.
571. United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 297-301 (1981).
572. Id. at 297-98.
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profit from a trademark applies to a registrant's thoughts that occurred
prior to its enactment.573 That is, the ACPA deprives registrants of
property based on thoughts that were lawful at the time the registrants
were thinking them. Before November 1999, it was legal for cyber-
squatters to intend to profit from selling a domain name containing a
trademark.574 At that time, trademark holders had no viable claim
against a cybersquatter who merely registered the domain name and
intended to sell it.575 After the enactment of the ACPA, the govern-
ment was able to deprive cybersquatters of their property based on a
cyberquatter's thoughts that occurred before its enactment.576
An example of this retroactive application occurred in Sporty's
Farm.577 There, the intent at issue occurred well before the enactment
of the ACPA, and evidence strongly suggested that the defendant
changed its intent by the time the ACPA was enacted.578 No evidence
existed that the defendant had the same intent at the time of the
ACPA as when it registered the domain name.579 Nevertheless, the
court applied the ACPA based on thoughts that, prior to the ACPA,
were lawful.580 Although the defendant argued that the application
573. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2000) (statutory note) ("[T]his title ... shall apply to all
domain names registered before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act .... ");
Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 499 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding bad-
faith intent based on thoughts occurring prior to the ACPA).
574. See discussion supra Part III (concluding that traditional doctrines of trademark
law do not prohibit cybersquatting).
575. See discussion supra Part III.
576. See sources cited supra note 573. It should be noted that the retroactivity provi-
sion of the ACPA does not explicitly state that courts may find a bad-faith intent retroactively;
instead it states that "this title.., shall apply to all domain names registered before, on, or
after the date of the enactment of this Act... " 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (statutory note). This pro-
vision could be construed to mean that the retroactive effect applies only to the property, not
the thoughts, so that it merely turns the "registration or trafficking" requirement into a "pos-
session" requirement. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1. It is arguable, then, that the statute is
not retroactive with respect to the conduct at issue-thinking impermissible thoughts. Indeed,
this argument is compelling as the Supreme Court has stated that because "[rietroactivity is not
favored in the law ... congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed
to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result." Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). Nevertheless, as discussed in this subpart, courts have
applied the ACPA in a retroactive fashion based on thoughts occurring prior to the ACPA. To
be legally precise, then, the argument of unconstitutional retroactivity applies not to the
ACPA, but rather to its application.
577. 202 F.3d 489.
578. Id at 499. Prior to the ACPA, but after the litigation had commenced, the defen-
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was unlawfully retroactive, the court proceeded to so apply it.
581
Exemplified in Sporty's Farm, the ACPA's retroactive effect
was the exact danger that the Supreme Court has forbidden against.
A registrant who acquired a domain name before the enactment of the
ACPA with the intent to profit from a mark contained within the do-
main name, should have had the opportunity to conform his or her in-
tent to the new standard.582  The retroactivity of the ACPA prevents
this opportunity. Furthermore, its retroactive provision does not sat-
isfy the specific conditions that are necessary for such legislation to
be constitutional.583 First, the retroactivity is not limited to a short pe-
riod.584 The statute applies to all thoughts by registrants, whenever
those thoughts occurred. Second, the ACPA does not further any
specific government program.585 For these reasons, the retroactive
application of the ACPA appears to violate the reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations of a cybersquatter. The third factor of the
Penn Central balancing test suggests that the ACPA effects a taking
of a registrant's property.
VI. CONCLUSION
Through the ACPA, the government exercises eminent domain
over a registrant's property rights in a domain name. The arguments
in support of this conclusion can be summarized as follows: First, a
registrant who uses his or her domain name to engage in cybersquat-
ting does not violate a mark holder's property rights under the tradi-
581. Id. at 502. The court justified its holding on the purported fact that the relief was
prospective. Id. Cf Ford Motor Co. v. Catalanotte, 342 F.3d 543, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2003) (ap-
plying statute retroactively with respect to property but not with respect to bad-faith intent); E.
& J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 277 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002) (refusing to
consider whether the ACPA is retroactive). It reasoned that a prospective injunction is based
on current and future conduct, so this implies that the bad-faith intent is continuing. Sporty's
Fann, 202 F.3d at 499. This reasoning is flawed. The argument essentially posits that the reg-
istrant presently has a bad-faith intent merely because the remedy has the capability to prevent
the registrant from engaging in such thoughts. But the capability of preventing ongoing con-
duct does not imply that the conduct is in fact ongoing. Moreover, no evidence suggested that
the defendant continued to have this bad-faith intent; indeed, evidence suggested the opposite.
The court's inference of a continuing bad-faith intent was unjustified, and its holding was in-
deed based on the defendant's thoughts that occurred prior to the ACPA.
582. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994).
583. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 731 (1984); E.
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528 (1998).
584. See Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 731.
585. See id. It cannot be argued that the ACPA furthers a government program for reg-
istering domain names because ICANN, a private entity, is in control of that program. See
discussion supra Part II.B.
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tional doctrines of trademark law; cybersquatting violates neither the
doctrine of trademark infringement nor the doctrine of trademark di-
lution.5 86 This argument implies that the government does not simply
exercise its police power for violation of an existing property right
when the government appropriates a domain name through the
ACPA.
Second, a registrant holds property rights in a domain name,
which rights receive Fifth Amendment protection.5 87 This conclusion
arises from the following three premises: (1) legal authority recog-
nizes that a domain name is a res over which a registrant holds prop-
erty rights;588 (2) those rights consist of the ability to control a spe-
cific arrangement of data within the Internet medium; 589 and (3)
Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Takings Clause protects
such arrangements of data.
590
Third, the purported expansion of a mark holder's property rights
under the ACPA effects a governmental taking of a cybersquatter's
property.591 This conclusion follows from a takings analysis under
the Penn Central balancing test.592 Under the first factor of the test,
the ACPA should be characterized as a governmental action that re-
sults in a physical appropriation, which characterization is sufficient
to find a taking regardless of the other Penn Central factors. 593 Sup-
port for this characterization of the ACPA stems from the following
subarguments: (1) the ACPA's apparent regulation of a single use of a
domain name is unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds: by
prohibiting bad-faith intent, the statute punishes registrants for ex-
pressions of thought; 594 and (2) the "single use" of a domain name
that the ACPA regulates actually allows the government to deprive a
registrant of all property rights solely on the basis that the registrant
lawfully owns property.595 The third factor of the Penn Central bal-
ancing test also strongly suggests that the ACPA constitutes a tak-
586. See discussion supra Part III.
587. See discussion supra Part V.A.
588. See discussion supra Part V.A.I.b.
589. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
590. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
591. See discussion supra Part V.B.
592. See discussion supra Part V.B.
593. See discussion supra Part V.B. 1.
594. See discussion supra Part V.B. La.
595. See discussion supra Part V.B. 1b.
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ing.596 The retroactive nature of the ACPA upsets the reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations of a cybersquatter. 597  The ACPA
therefore effects a taking according to the first and third factors of the
Penn Central balancing test. Absent just compensation 598 to the cy-
bersquatter, the ACPA violates the Takings Clause.5 99
The constitutional failing of the ACPA is understandable. Bruce
Ackerman describes the circumstances that advance takings legisla-
tion in the following words: "[The] legal problem arises at the point
where capitalist economy and activist state collide .... [T]he state
surveys the outcome of market processes and finds them wanting.
Armed with a prodigious array of legal tools, it sets about improving
upon the invisible hand, taxing here, subsidizing there, regulating eve-
rywhere. 600  Those circumstances appear to be present here. The
market for domain names was producing a result that was most ineq-
uitable: person who had contributed nothing to the value of a trade-
mark was profiting at the expense of the person who did.60 1 The rea-
son that the domain-name market appeared "wanting" was likely
596. See discussion supra Part V.B.3.
597. See discussion supra Part V.B.3.
598. The Supreme Court has defined "just compensation" to be the fair market value of
the property at the time of the taking. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970). Be-
cause the Internet has evolved into an integral medium of commercial business, mark hold-
ers-and their competitors-place a high premium on domain names that incorporate their
marks. See Lee, supra note 376, at 103 ("[A] domain name mirroring or including a corporate
name or trademark is a valuable corporate asset in facilitating communication with a customer
base."). Indeed, the pragmatic appeal of the Toeppen line of cases lies in the fact that mark
holders place a high value on having a domain name containing their mark. Consequently, the
market value of domain names containing trademarks being high, the amount of just compen-
sation due to cybersquatters from whom the government has taken domain names is high as
well.
599. It could be argued that the ACPA effects a taking independent of whether just
compensation has been provided because the government takes the domain name without ex-
ercising its power of eminent domain. The Constitution allows for the exercise of eminent
domain only if the government appropriates the property for public use. U.S. CONST. amend.
V. Absent an appropriation for public use, the government takes property outside the bounda-
ries of eminent domain. Id. The ACPA arguably does not effectuate an exercise of eminent
domain because it appropriates property for a mark holder-a private use.
This argument is tenuous. So long as the government exercises eminent domain in a way
that is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose," the government satisfies this pub-
lic-use requirement. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). The ACPA ap-
pears to fulfill this rational-relationship condition. By transferring domain names from cyber-
squatters to mark holders, the government fulfills the public purpose of allowing Internet
consumers to readily identify the websites of mark holders. This action conceivably, though
not practically, creates a more efficient method for the public to navigate on the Internet.
600. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1977).
601. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 5-6 (1999).
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because of a simple market failure. Cybersquatting came into being
because, for some reason, mark holders failed to register the domain
names corresponding to their marks before cybersquatters did.60 ' The
reason for this failure was likely that when the Internet medium was
still relatively novel, mark holders were unaware of the financial
value in registering their marks (and deviations thereof) as domain
names. In contrast, cybersquatters foresaw the profitability of the
Internet, and consequently, registered domain names while the Inter-
net medium was still in its infancy. Cybersquatters sought to capital-
ize on information that others lacked. If all mark holders knew in
1994 what the Internet would be in 2004, they would have immedi-
ately registered their marks as domain names. But they did not know,
so cybersquatters took advantage of that knowledge. The ACPA,
then, appears to be the legislative solution to an outcome resulting
from asymmetric information in the market for domain names.
The situation today is much different. The smoke has cleared
from the Internet explosion. Knowing the value of the Internet, the
mark holder is no longer at a disadvantage to a computer wizard who
foresaw the Internet's commercial value. Indeed, the opposite is true.
New mark holders possess more information than any potential cy-
bersquatter because the mark holders control when the public will be
aware of their marks. With this knowledge, a mark holder can regis-
ter the corresponding domain name before a cybersquatter can. In ef-
fect, the mark holder now possesses the valuable asymmetric informa-
tion. Knowledge of the Internet's value is now widespread, so only
through the mark holder's neglect does the cybersquatter capitalize on
the value of a trademark in a domain name. Legislation to protect a
person from his or her own financial neglect seems unwarranted. 60 3 It
is the mark holder's choice whether to cash in on the domain-name
602. The analogous fact in the bridge narrative from Part I is that Mark "curiously"
failed to build a bridge between the mainland and his island before Cy did. See discussion su-
pra Part I.
603. This rationale is consistent with the policy underlying Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800
Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996). See discussion supra Part III.A.l.a. In Holiday
Inns, the Sixth Circuit held that it was permissible for the defendant to secure a vanity tele-
phone number that was confusingly similar to the plaintiffs' vanity number, for the "sole pur-
pose" of intercepting callers who were attempting to reach Holiday Inns. Id. at 621. The court
noted that "the phenomenon of misdialed vanity numbers is apparently so well known that
businesses ... subscribe to both their vanity and complementary numbers in order to ensure
receiving calls from all their potential customers. Holiday Inns, however, neglected to take
this precaution and did not reserve any complementary numbers." Id. Thus, the court seemed
to rule the way it did because of the policy that a mark holder should bear the burden of reserv-
ing a trademark's right in a certain medium.
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opportunity.6 °4
In sum, the past problem of asymmetric information no longer
exists. The legislation to fix that problem-the ACPA-amounts to
an effort to strip a registrant of the fruits resulting from capitalizing
on asymmetric information. The value of that legislation is now null,
as the market has resolved the inequitable situation. The cost of that
legislation, however, remains great: an unconstitutional taking.
604. While it will always be possible for a cybersquatter to create domain names that
contain trademarks, these creative domain names do not pose a threat to the mark holder's
ability to transact business on the Internet. Given the current state of perfect information in the
market for domain names, if the mark holder were not to value a creative deviation of a do-
main name containing the trademark, the Internet public would not likely associate the cyber-
squatter's creative domain name with the mark holder. For example, Nike Inc. could register
"nike.com," "nikeshoes.com," "nike-shoe.com," and myriad more domain names that incorpo-
rate its mark; and a cybersquatter could then register "this is the website of nike.com." The
Internet public does not think to type in the cybersquatter's domain name when searching for
Nike's website. Such creative domain names are not valuable to the mark holder; if they were,
the mark holder would have registered them.
It is possible, however, that a mark holder may believe that a deviation of the mark will
not be popular as a domain name when it fact it turns out to be. The fact that a mark holder
incorrectly estimates which domain names will be the most popular in representing the mark is
no reason to protect that mark holder against domain-name registrants who believe otherwise.
If the mark holder fails to register a particular deviation of the mark as a domain name, the
mark holder must live with the consequences of that choice.
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